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## **Editorial** ***Éditorial***

Hania Zlotnik  
Vice President / *Vice-Président*

These are exciting times for those working in population studies. Since 1928, when the IUSSP was founded, unprecedented changes have taken place in population dynamics. Today, population ageing as a result of reductions in fertility is already a reality in a growing number of populations and not just the product of the demographer's projection kit. Urban life, long the norm in developed countries, continues to expand rapidly in the developing world. And as these and other changes foreseen some decades ago become reality, the task of imagining what the future may bring becomes more challenging, especially in light of the setbacks brought about by the emergence of HIV/AIDS and of the persistence of diversity in population trends both within and between nations.

Since the Union's creation, its scientific activities have contributed to enhance our understanding of past population trends and to frame hypotheses about future prospects. By fostering discussion, debate, and the general exchange of ideas on important population issues, the Union acts as a catalyst in the path to knowledge. The work of Union members contributes to quantify, understand and even influence the course of change. Aware that the effects of population change impinge on many areas of human endeavour, the outgoing Council adopted an ambitious research agenda that includes such varied topics as poverty and population, the health consequences of longer lives, the impact of new health threats, and the complex interrelations between population and sustainable development. The success of the recent General Population Conference held in Salvador, Brazil, owes much to the variety of topics and issues it addressed. From the analysis of adolescent behaviour in relation to reproductive health to the discussion of the measurement of forced migration, population specialists brought to each topic the perspective of a discipline based on quantification. Translating hypotheses into measurable outcomes and developing data collection instruments that provide the measures needed to test hypotheses constitutes the cornerstone of our profession. The rich and varied scientific activities sponsored by the Union allow

population specialists from all over the world to bring this perspective to bear not only in addressing intriguing research questions, but also those whose answers have vital implications for future development and human well-being.

As a new cycle in the Union starts, the incoming Council has the task of maintaining the high standards established by its predecessors and of ensuring that the scientific resources of the Union are nurtured. At a time when the relevance of population issues is high, the scientific activities of the Union must continue to focus on both the enhancement of methodologies and the advancement of knowledge. Devising better tools to investigate the world is just as important as discovering new fields of endeavour in which to try those tools. The Council counts on the active participation of members to expand the Union's work in those directions. We are sure Union members will respond to the challenging questions addressed by the scientific activities already planned and will help us fashion the research agenda for the coming years.

*Notre époque est passionnante pour ceux qui travaillent dans le domaine de la démographie. Depuis 1928, année de création de l'UIESP, la dynamique des populations a subi des changements sans précédent. De nos jours, le vieillissement de la population dû à la baisse de la fécondité n'est plus seulement le résultat des calculs prospectifs des démographes, c'est déjà une réalité dans un nombre croissant de sociétés. La vie urbaine, qui fut longtemps l'apanage des pays développés, continue à progresser rapidement dans les pays en voie de développement. Et puisque ces changements et d'autres prévus il y a quelques dizaines d'années se réalisent, concevoir ce que le futur pourrait apporter devient une tâche de plus en plus importante, en particulier à la lumière des revers dus à l'émergence du VIH/SIDA et de la persistance de la diversité des tendances démographiques entre les pays et à l'intérieur de ceux-ci.*

*Depuis sa création, les activités scientifiques de l'Union ont contribué à améliorer notre compréhension des tendances démographiques du passé et à élaborer des hypothèses sur les évolutions futures. En engageant des discussions, des débats et un échange général d'idées sur des problèmes démographiques importants, l'Union joue un rôle de catalyseur sur le chemin de la connaissance. Les travaux des membres de l'Union contribuent à quantifier, comprendre et même influencer le cours de l'évolution. Conscient des effets des changements démographiques sur de nombreux champs de l'activité humaine, le Conseil sortant a adopté un programme*

*de recherche ambitieux, qui comprend des thèmes variés tels que la pauvreté et la population, les conséquences de l'allongement de la durée de la vie sur la santé, la montée de nouvelles menaces sanitaires et les interactions complexes entre la démographie et le développement durable. Le succès du récent Congrès général organisé à Salvador (Brésil) doit beaucoup à la variété des sujets et des questions abordés. Depuis l'analyse du comportement des adolescents en matière de santé génésique jusqu'à la discussion sur la façon de mesurer les migrations forcées, les démographes ont apporté à chaque sujet la perspective d'une discipline fondée sur la quantification. Traduire des hypothèses en résultats quantifiables et développer des outils de collecte des données fournissant les mesures nécessaires pour tester les hypothèses, c'est ce qui constitue la pierre angulaire de notre profession. Les activités scientifiques importantes et diversifiées parrainées par l'Union permettent aux démographes du monde entier d'utiliser cette perspective, non seulement pour aborder des questions scientifiques pointues, mais également celles dont les réponses ont une incidence vitale sur le développement et le bien-être futurs de l'humanité.*

*À l'occasion du début d'un nouveau cycle de l'Union, le Conseil entrant se doit de maintenir le niveau élevé établi par ses prédécesseurs et d'alimenter les ressources scientifiques de l'Union. À une époque où la pertinence des questions démographiques est considérable, les activités scientifiques de l'Union doivent continuer à se concentrer aussi bien sur l'amélioration des méthodologies que sur l'accumulation des connaissances. L'élaboration d'outils mieux adaptés pour analyser le monde est tout aussi importante que la découverte de nouveaux domaines au sein desquels ces outils peuvent être utilisés. Le Conseil compte sur la participation active des membres pour amplifier les travaux de l'Union dans ces directions. Nous sommes persuadés que les membres de l'Union répondront aux défis posés par les activités scientifiques déjà planifiées et nous aideront à mettre au point le programme de recherche des années à venir.*

## **Address by the Incoming President, Jacques Vallin, to the Closing Session of the XXIVth IUSSP General Conference**

Dear Colleagues, Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Between now and year-end, the usual four-yearly elections will take place in the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, and by next January, the IUSSP will have a new Council. By a quirk of our Constitution, I shall myself at the very same time become the Union's President as a result of a vote taken ... four years ago. There are benefits to this admitted legal oddity: Union is certain four years in advance of having a new President at the right time, and the President has had four years as Vice-President to ease into his or her new role. However, this is not without its inconsistencies.

One is that the Vice-President, who obviously has ideas about how the Union should be run, stands for election with no program of his/her own. And for good reason, because the program scheduled to come into effect is not his, but that of the preceding Vice-President who, four years earlier, also had no opportunity, for the self-same reasons, to place it before the electorate.

Another is that the Vice-President is a President-elect who is not sure whether his ideas will be lucky enough to gain the approval of a Council which has not yet been elected.

And yet, the system works, and I have no intention of pushing forward constitutional reforms. I simply mention this somewhat odd situation only to say that I may have been fortunate not to have had to put forward a program when I was elected, because four years on, the scene has changed so radically that it would most probably have looked outdated if not downright obsolete by now.

Both the internal and external scenes have changed. First - and there is no avoiding the rhetoric - we are in a new century, and even a new millennium. But, for once, is it really just a cliché? Obviously, as deductive thinkers, we might assume that the change between 1997 (Peking) and 2001 (Salvador) is not fundamentally different from that between 1993 (Montreal) and 1997. Above all, we shall not let ourselves be overawed by the mere fact that the second interval contains the celebrated, triple-zero millennium year 2000! Absolutely not! But we must, even so, acknowledge that while the 6



billion people by 2000 predicted in the 1950s by our United Nations colleagues indelibly impressed - not to say alarmed - many of our contemporaries up to the highest reaches of national and international policymaking, the 10 billion by 2050 - which may end up as only 8 or 9 - no longer raises an eyebrow. Better still, with the deadline looming ahead and the 5 billion mark already overshot, the forecasts for 2000 continued to grip imaginations and, on the political front, after Bucharest 1974 and Mexico City 1984, the 1994 Cairo Conference was still a battleground for the clash of dogmas. But the outlook was quick to change, and we already know that there will be no major intergovernmental conference on population in 2004.

So, what happened? The fact is that the 1990s witnessed both the expected and unexpected fall of the last bastion of overheated population growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility decline was expected. The only questions were in what time-frame and at what speed. The information gleaned from the Demographic and Health Surveys programme from the mid-1990s in particular gave sufficient evidence to think that the sporadic early signs of decline were poised to spread everywhere and that, overall, the rate would be faster than expected. What was unexpected was the sudden emergence of the terrible AIDS epidemic. While it has not - as some doommerchants of the 1980s foretold - "wiped Africa off the map", it certainly checked the population growth of many African countries, and is now even threatening to reverse it in some.

In short, the population explosion scare has receded. And while we may have initially helped to fan the fear by pushing our population projections as far as we did, we also did much to help allay it. First, by developing one of our greatest theories, the demographic transition which helped put this phenomenon back into its proper perspective - an admittedly crucial, but passing phase of behavioural modernization. Then, later, through projections which - especially through the work of Thomas Frejka, later taken up by the United Nations - began to point towards long-term stabilization. Therefore, it was goodbye to far-fetched speculative predictions about growth, but also goodbye to the very particular heed which policy-makers and financial backers paid to our beloved demographic research.

For that, too, is one of the main fundamentals of the new order of the 1990s for us: the generous funds which allowed the IUSSP to build itself and develop its scientific activities in a range of new

areas have rapidly petered out and become harder to get. One of the immediate jobs for the outgoing Council, especially the Secretary-General, was to deal with these harder financial times. This involved moving the headquarters to less costly premises in Paris, with a subsidy from the French Government and support from the INED, deep staffing (and pay) cuts in the Secretariat... to mention a few. The incoming Council will have to carry on adjusting to the new realities, but also go all-out to find new sources of funds, for while world population pressure may not be - or appear to be - what it was 10 or even 5 years ago, this does not mean that governments can safely turn away from, not to say write off, future population changes. The challenge for us is to show not only that our work is and will long remain relevant to scientific advance, but also that it is still essential to framing and implementing policies which, if they are not always able to steer change in the right direction, can at least get to grips with the likely consequences. And I personally believe that the IUSSP can be instrumental in this regard. That does not mean seeing it as our job to tell the politicians what to do. No - what we have to do is reaffirm our commitment to push back the bounds of scientific knowledge and spread it as widely as possible. I think it is obvious that the Union needed to change, but I believe just as sincerely that the key to its success remains in the hands of its scientific committees, the best evidence of which is the quality publications they produce.

As I said at the beginning, I have as yet no proper program to announce for the next four years. That must wait until the new Council has been elected and taken office. All I shall do here is to map out a few avenues for thought which I hope might provide guidance for setting up new scientific committees, or the groundwork for the next general congress.

The heralded end of the demographic transition - and its prospective stabilization of the world population at an essentially fairly reasonable level in the short term - has allowed us to finally consign to the dustbin of history the wilder doomsday scenarios that still abounded in the 1970s. But we know even now that stabilization is just a snare and a delusion. Not only is the future still beset by pitfalls, it has never been so uncertain. Did we imagine that all the populations of the world would soon achieve that maximum life expectancy which is within humankind's biological grasp? The fact is, that the closer we get to it, the less we know about where that limit may lie - or even if it truly exists. Did we imagine that all

populations would simply converge on fertility of around 2 children per woman, securing their own replacement and the final stabilization of the world population? What we are seeing today is anything but that - a growing number of countries settled at a level of low or even very low fertility which we cannot describe as a trend or a simple blip. In short, the end of the demographic transition also sounds the death knell of the theory of that name - in other words, the key paradigm which has underpinned our discipline for at least half a century. We are seriously short of (or perhaps over-supplied with, which amounts to the same thing) theories to understand, explain, and predict the future, at least beyond the current decline in mortality and fertility where they remain high. Arguably, our first task now more than ever to maintain our profession's good name is to work on theory. That is already being done, and it gives me pleasure in passing to pay tribute to the work of Dirk van de Kaa, the IUSSP 2001 laureate, on the second demographic transition. It is a field of study where the Union should clearly put a major focus on future developments.

While demographic transition theory may be dead and buried, the end of the transition is only in the offing. It would be foolhardy for us to forget that, and even more so not to keep hammering it home to our leaders. On Monday, we discussed whether the Cairo Conference on Population and Development had achieved or missed its aim. There is at least one score on which it completely missed: it moved not one inch forward on the economic and social development of the poorest countries - most of tropical Africa, part of Asia and some Latin American countries - which will also have to bear almost the full brunt of world population growth in the coming decades. Right as it was to speak out against yesterday's doomsday scenarios, I would see it as unforgivable not to study and put a public spotlight on the potential economic, social, and political repercussions of this attitude of the international community, not just for the countries concerned, but for the entire world. What is the point of globalisation if the development issues raised by population change are not addressed on a global scale? This is one (but not the only) issue which could arguably fit into the partnership that the Director of UNFPA, Ms Obaid, called for in her splendid opening remarks.

I would like to look beyond these two core issues to mention four more specific topics which the Union would be well-advised to

look at in the next four years. The first three you will doubtless be expecting and so they may seem pretty obvious. And this is a clear sign of the robust state of the international community of demographers. The fourth may be a lot less evident.

Population ageing, one burning issue for our profession, has now risen to the top of wealthy nations' agendas. We understand the demographic mechanisms of population ageing: fertility decline, followed more recently by lengthening life expectancies. We know less about the underlying factors, and far less still about how far it can go. We also have to spell out the consequences. How healthy will tomorrow's older people be? How will Western societies cope with possibly having more than half their populations aged over 60, and untold numbers of centenarians? And what about countries with younger populations heading the same way, but at a much higher pace? Two of the Union's scientific committees are already looking into this, and they are not too many. I would even wager that the end of their terms of office will still find them with a job of work to do.

Lengthening life expectancies may make population ageing inevitable, but we must not forget that fertility decline is what started the ball rolling, and persistent very low fertility would make tomorrow's problems even worse than expected. More generally, it could also place question marks over the very long-term survival of humankind. Reducing the world population to under five billion - or even under one - would not be unwelcome to some green policy purists. This we know. But have we gauged the consequences of such a drop? Put differently, we have by no means exhausted the topic of this Wednesday's discussions, and should continue to place a large focus on it in the coming four years. It is a second issue with much yet to be said about it! Not to mention the linkages that exist with the far-reaching changes in the evolution of families and life-courses.

The big problem of our times may be that of having poor countries with population growth set to remain very high for some decades yet living alongside rich countries under severe threat of population loss. Obviously, international migration is no real answer to this imbalance: the main key to that is the economic and social development of poor countries. But it could still oil the wheels a little, bringing to both sides some ways of addressing their most pressing needs. It is surprising that in a world where free trade and

globalisation are held up as good, and where barriers to trade in goods and services are officially held as bad, borders on the other hand have become almost insuperable bulwarks against would-be migrants. People have long had a recognized right to live as long as biology and medicine will allow; more recently, they have also gained the right to decide how many children they shall have. Why should they not soon have the right to migrate to where they wish on this planet? Whatever else, the Union will certainly have to put a growing focus on the issue of international migration flows.

But this issue of fundamental freedom and right to demographic behaviour leads me directly on to the fourth point that you may not be expecting quite so much, but which arguably demands more of our attention in the coming years: the relationships between demography and human rights. I am under no illusions about this. The end of human rights violations, enshrined for over 50 years in the United Nations' Universal Declaration, is not around the corner. And yet arguably, the 21st century should be able to make concrete progress in this field. Public opinion is increasingly concerned, and policy instruments which would have been unimaginable a few short years ago are gradually being put in place. I am not talking about the international community's operational arm, which is too much in thrall to the interests of the powerful to really attend to the rights of the weak, but the "right of humanitarian interference" that we now hear so much about, the forthcoming, but still fairly hesitant, setting up of an international criminal court, or the even less lofty, newly-assigned jurisdiction to the national courts of some countries to judge any war crime or crime against humanity. But where does demography fit into all that, you may wonder. Quite closely. Our profession has its own small contribution to make to this noble venture. As far back as 12 years ago at the New Delhi Congress, myself, Thérèse Locoh and others asked the then newly-elected Council to set up a scientific committee on "demography and human rights". In the event, it chose to prioritise other issues. But times have changed. Statisticians and demographers are increasingly aware of their duty to act and speak out in this field. At last year's PAA meeting in Los Angeles, for example, Bill Seltzer arranged a compelling meeting on "Human rights, population statistics and demography". Not only do we need to reflect more on the linkages between our investigative methods and respect for individual liberties, but studies done in connection with the recent dread-

ful crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia showed how vital demographers could be in bringing the truth to light. From Chechnya to Central Africa, how many war crimes, how many crimes against humanity have not only gone unpunished, but even simply undiscovered, because no one is really keeping count. It seems to me that we should not be shy about coming forward with our contribution to a better knowledge of facts which are a sad blot on humanity but whose mere recognition does much to stop them slipping into oblivion. As it happens, a few weeks ago Helge Brunborg put forward a proposal to set up a working group on the demography of conflict and violence. I think we must look at the larger picture and so I intend proposing that the new Council set up a committee on demography and human rights.

Again, please do not take these few thoughts as a four-year program. Let us wait for the new Council before coming to a decision. But, as you can see, there is no shortage of lines of inquiry. I have no doubt that the forthcoming elections will produce a team resolved to pull out all the stops to give the Union - through its scientific committees, seminars, conferences and congresses - what it needs to be a visible and active member of the international scientific community, working for the advancement of knowledge on key issues for our societies.

I cannot conclude without adding my sincere thanks to those just proffered by James Trussell, and hailing the splendid success of this Salvador Congress. I should like to thank each and every one of those who have worked for months to make the Congress a success, but there are too many to thank by name, so I hope you will forgive me. Even so, I should like to add to James' thanks a very special and personal thank you to the Union's Secretariat which had to cope with the bulk of the job in the midst of a trying transitional period. Let me also congratulate our Brazilian colleagues on the national organizing committee again for a wholly admirable job: I am sure I will offend neither Elsa Berquo nor Eduardo Rios Neto who chaired it with such flair, if I extend a special vote of thanks to Maria Coleta Oliveira for her efficient and committed coordination of the whole operation. And talking of successes, let me just say, since I think there is every probability that the incoming Council will take up the French Government's offer to hold our next congress in France, that I sincerely hope that four years hence we shall be able to offer you a general congress as successful as that of Salvador, and

that our best bet for that would be to have the advice and support of our Brazilian colleagues, especially Maria Coleta!

I look forward to seeing you all in four years time, then, somewhere in France, for a 25th Congress as compelling and welcoming as that of Salvador de Bahia!

## ***Allocution de Jacques Vallin, Président élu, à la séance de clôture du XXIV<sup>e</sup> Congrès Général de l'UIESP***

*Chers collègues, chers amis, mesdames, messieurs,*

*D'ici la fin de l'année, comme tous les quatre ans, des élections auront lieu au sein de l'Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population et, en janvier prochain, l'UIESP sera dotée d'un nouveau Conseil. Mais les statuts de cette association sont ainsi faits qu'à ce même moment, j'en deviendrai moi-même le président en vertu d'un vote qui a déjà eu lieu... il y a quatre ans. Cette curiosité juridique présente, certes, des avantages. Quatre ans à l'avance, l'Union est assurée d'avoir, le moment venu, un nouveau président et celui-ci aura eu quatre ans pour s'initier, comme vice-président, à la tâche qui l'attendait. Mais elle ne va pas non plus sans paradoxes.*

*Paradoxe que cette élection d'un vice-président qui, vous n'en doutez pas, a des idées sur la marche de l'Union, mais qui se présente aux suffrages sans programme. Et pour cause, le programme qui va entrer en vigueur n'est pas le sien, mais celui du vice-président précédent qui, quatre ans plus tôt, n'avait lui-même, pour les mêmes raisons, pas eu la possibilité de le présenter à ses électeurs.*

*Paradoxe aussi que ce vice-président en passe de devenir président et qui ne sait toujours pas encore si ses idées auront l'heur de plaire à un Conseil qui n'est pas encore élu.*

*Pourtant, l'institution fonctionne et je n'ai nullement l'intention de proposer une réforme des statuts. Je voulais tout simplement vous dire, en évoquant cette situation étonnante, qu'il était en effet peut-être préférable que je n'aie pas eu à présenter de programme lors de mon élection. En effet, quatre ans plus tard, le paysage a tellement changé qu'un tel programme aurait eu bien des chances de paraître aujourd'hui un peu désuet, voire carrément obsolète.*

*Le paysage a changé tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur.*

*D'abord, on n'échappe pas à la rhétorique, nous avons changé de*

*siècle et même de millénaire. Mais, pour une fois, est-ce vraiment faire de la rhétorique ? Certes, en bon rationalistes que nous sommes, nous pourrions penser que passer de 1997 (Pékin) à 2001 (Salvador) n'est pas foncièrement différent de passer de 1993 (Montréal) à 1997. Nous n'allons tout de même pas nous laisser impressionner par le seul fait que le second intervalle contient le fameux millésime 2000 et ses trois zéros ! Non ! Il nous faut pourtant reconnaître que si la prévision faite, dès les années 1950, par nos collègues des Nations Unies de 6 milliards d'hommes en l'an 2000 a fortement marqué les esprits, effrayé même nombre de nos contemporains et jusqu'aux plus hautes instances politiques nationales et internationales, les 10 milliards de 2050, qui ne seront d'ailleurs peut-être même que 8 ou 9, n'excitent plus personne. Mieux, alors même que l'échéance approchait et que l'on avait déjà largement franchi le cap des 5 milliards, les prévisions pour l'an 2000 continuaient de frapper les imaginations et, sur le terrain politique, après Bucarest 1974, après Mexico 1984, la Conférence du Caire, en 1994, a encore été le champ clos de joutes idéologiques majeures. Mais très vite ensuite, la vision des choses a changé. Et l'on sait déjà qu'il n'y aura pas de grande conférence inter-gouvernementale sur la population en 2004.*

*Que s'est-il donc passé ? En fait, au cours de la décennie 1990, le dernier bastion de la surchauffe démographique a cédé en Afrique subsaharienne, de manière attendue et inattendue tout à la fois. Attendue, la baisse de la fécondité l'était. La seule incertitude tenant au délai d'attente et au rythme avec lequel le mouvement se produirait. Dès le milieu des années 1990, grâce notamment aux informations provenant du programme des enquêtes démographiques et de santé, on avait assez d'éléments pour penser que les baisses amorcées ici ou là étaient en passe de se généraliser et que, globalement, le rythme allait en être plus rapide qu'espéré. Moins attendue et plus cruelle fut l'irruption de l'épidémie de sida. Si cette dernière n'a pas, comme l'annonçaient dans les années 1980 certains oiseaux de mauvais augure, "rayé l'Afrique de la carte", elle a bel et bien freiné la croissance démographique de nombre de pays africains, menaçant même aujourd'hui certains d'entre eux de décroissance.*

*Bref, la grande peur de l'explosion démographique est révolue. Et d'ailleurs, si nous avons au départ contribué à la répandre par l'audace de nos projections démographiques, nous avons tout autant, sinon plus, contribué à l'éteindre, d'abord à travers l'énoncé d'une de nos plus belles théories, la théorie de la transition démographique, qui permettait de ramener l'événement à de plus justes proportions : une phase cruciale, certes, mais temporaire, de la modernisation des comportements, puis, à nouveau*



*grâce aux projections qui, notamment avec les travaux de Thomas Frejka, repris ensuite par les Nations Unies, se fondaient désormais sur une perspective de stabilisation à long terme. Finies les spéculations sur la croissance jusqu'à l'absurde. Finie aussi l'attention toute particulière portée par les pouvoirs politiques et les bailleurs de fonds à nos chères études démographiques...*

*Car c'est bien là aussi, pour nous, l'un des éléments majeurs de la nouvelle donne des années 1990 : les moyens assez abondants qui avaient permis à l'UIESP de se renforcer et de développer ses activités scientifiques dans nombre de domaines novateurs se sont assez vite faits moins abondants et plus difficiles d'accès. D'ores et déjà, l'une des tâches du Conseil sortant, et notamment de notre secrétaire général, a été de faire face à cette conjoncture moins favorable : transfert à Paris vers un siège moins coûteux et assorti d'une subvention du Gouvernement français et du soutien de l'INED, réduction drastique du personnel (et des salaires) au secrétariat... le nouveau Conseil devra poursuivre l'aggiornamento, mais aussi déployer tous ses efforts pour trouver d'autres voies de financement car, si la pression démographique mondiale est, ou peut paraître, moins forte aujourd'hui qu'il y a 10 ou même 5 ans, cela ne signifie nullement que les gouvernements puissent sans risque se désintéresser, voire ignorer les changements démographiques à venir. À nous de faire la preuve que non seulement nos travaux sont et resteront longtemps encore utiles au progrès de la science, mais qu'ils continuent aussi d'être un préalable à la définition et à la mise en œuvre de politiques capables, sinon toujours d'orienter les changements dans la direction la plus favorable, du moins de faire face aux conséquences à en attendre. Et je suis personnellement convaincu que l'UIESP peut faire beaucoup dans ce sens. Il n'est pas nécessaire pour cela de nous croire investis de la mission de dire aux politiques ce qu'ils doivent faire. Il nous faut au contraire réaffirmer notre volonté de faire progresser la connaissance scientifique et de la diffuser aussi largement que possible. Je pense, certes, que l'Union avait besoin de changer, mais je crois aussi sincèrement que les clés de son succès restent entre les mains de ses commissions scientifiques, dont le meilleur gage est de produire des publications de qualité.*

*Comme je le disais pour commencer, je ne suis pas vraiment en mesure de vous annoncer un programme pour les quatre ans qui viennent. Il faut pour cela attendre que le nouveau Conseil soit élu et prenne ses fonctions. Je me contenterai donc d'évoquer quelques pistes de réflexion qui, je l'espère, pourraient orienter la mise en place de nouvelles commissions scientifiques ou la préparation du prochain congrès général.*

*Si la fin annoncée de la transition démographique a pu nous permettre,*

*en nous offrant cette perspective de stabilisation prochaine de la population mondiale à un niveau somme toute assez modeste, de jeter définitivement aux orties les élucubrations catastrophistes qui fleurissaient encore dans les années 1970, nous savons déjà que cette stabilisation n'est qu'un miroir aux alouettes. Non seulement l'avenir reste semé d'embûches, mais il n'a jamais été aussi incertain. Pensions-nous que toutes les populations du monde finiraient bientôt par atteindre ce maximum d'espérance de vie auquel, biologiquement, l'espèce humaine peut prétendre ? En réalité, plus nous nous en rapprochons, plus nous ignorons où peut se situer ce maximum et même s'il y en a réellement un. Pensions-nous que, tout simplement, toutes les populations convergeraient vers une fécondité de l'ordre de 2 enfants par femme, assurant ainsi leur propre renouvellement et la stabilisation définitive de la population mondiale ? Nous voyons au contraire aujourd'hui un nombre croissant de pays s'installer dans un régime de faible, voire très faible fécondité, sans pouvoir dire s'il s'agit d'une tendance fondamentale ou d'un simple accident de parcours. Bref, la fin de la transition démographique s'avère aussi être la mort de la théorie du même nom, autrement dit, du principal paradigme sur lequel s'est appuyée notre discipline pendant au moins un demi-siècle. Nous manquons cruellement de théories (ou peut-être en avons-nous trop, ce qui revient au même) pour comprendre, expliquer, prévoir l'avenir, du moins au-delà de la réduction en cours de la mortalité et de la fécondité là où elles sont encore élevées. Plus que jamais, il me paraît évident que le premier effort que nous avons à faire pour conserver à notre discipline son attrait se situe au niveau des théories. Cet effort est déjà en cours. Je suis heureux de saluer ainsi au passage les travaux de Dirk van de Kaa, lauréat de l'UIESP pour 2001, sur la deuxième transition démographique. Nul doute que l'Union doive accorder toute son attention aux prochains développements dans ce domaine.*

*Mais, si la théorie de la transition démographique est d'ores et déjà morte et enterrée, la fin de la transition n'est qu'annoncée. Nous aurions grand tort de l'oublier et plus encore de manquer de le dire et redire à ceux qui nous gouvernent. Nous nous sommes demandé lundi si la conférence du Caire sur la population et le développement avait atteint ou manqué son but. Il y a au moins un point sur lequel elle l'a complètement manqué : elle n'a pas fait avancer d'un pouce la question du développement économique et social des pays pauvres les plus pauvres, qui sont aussi ceux qui vont avoir à assumer la quasi-totalité de la croissance démographique mondiale des prochaines décennies : l'essentiel de l'Afrique tropicale, une partie de l'Asie et quelques pays d'Amérique latine. Autant il était juste de contrer les parti-pris catastrophistes d'hier, autant, me semble-t-il, il serait*

*impardonnable de négliger d'étudier et de faire connaître les conséquences économiques, sociales, politiques que peut avoir cette attitude de la communauté internationale, non seulement pour les pays concernés mais aussi pour l'ensemble du monde. À quoi bon la mondialisation si les problèmes de développement que posent les changements démographiques ne sont pas pris en charge à l'échelle mondiale ? C'est un des thèmes (mais non le seul) qui, me semble-t-il, pourrait trouver sa place dans le partenariat que la Directrice du FNUAP, Madame Obaid, a appelé de ses vœux dans sa magnifique allocution d'ouverture.*

*Au-delà de ces deux thèmes majeurs, je voudrais évoquer quatre sujets plus spécifiques auxquels l'Union aura intérêt à porter attention dans les quatre prochaines années. Vous vous attendez sans doute tellement aux trois premiers qu'ils vous paraîtront presque banals, et c'est bien sûr un signe de l'excellente santé dans laquelle se trouve la communauté internationale des démographes... le quatrième l'est peut-être un peu moins. Il est une question de grande actualité pour la discipline et qui, parce qu'elle se trouve davantage aujourd'hui au cœur des préoccupations des pays riches, est tout à fait solvable : le vieillissement des populations. Nous connaissons les mécanismes démographiques du vieillissement : baisse de la fécondité, puis, plus récemment, croissance de l'espérance de vie. Nous connaissons moins bien les facteurs sous-jacents et nous savons encore moins jusqu'où le phénomène peut s'étendre. Il reste aussi à en préciser les conséquences. En quel état de santé seront nos vieux de demain ? Comment les sociétés occidentales pourront-elles trouver les voies d'adaptation à une situation où plus de la moitié de la population pourrait dépasser les 60 ans et où les centenaires seraient légion ? Et que dire des pays aujourd'hui plus jeunes qui vivront demain les mêmes évolutions en accéléré ? Deux commissions scientifiques de l'Union y travaillent déjà et ce n'est pas trop. Et je gage qu'au terme de leurs mandats il y aura encore beaucoup à faire...*

*Si, du fait de l'allongement de la vie, le vieillissement démographique est inéluctable, il ne faut pas oublier que c'est d'abord la baisse de la fécondité qui a enclenché le phénomène, et la persistance d'une très faible fécondité rendrait nos problèmes de demain encore plus aigus qu'on ne s'y attend. Mais une telle persistance pourrait aussi annoncer plus globalement la remise en cause à très long terme de l'existence de l'humanité. Certes, on le sait, ramener la population mondiale à moins de cinq milliards, ou même moins de un, ne serait pas pour déplaire à certains idéologues de l'écologie politique. Mais avons-nous mesuré les conséquences d'un tel repli ? Autrement dit, la question de ce débat que nous avons eu mercredi est loin d'être épuisée et devrait retenir une bonne part de notre attention ces quatre*

*prochaines années. C'est un deuxième thème plein d'avenir ! Sans parler des relations qu'il entretient avec les profonds changements en cours dans le domaine de la famille et du cycle de vie.*

*La principale difficulté des temps actuels est peut-être la juxtaposition de pays pauvres où la croissance de la population sera encore très forte durant quelques décennies et de pays riches fortement menacés de dépression démographique. Face à ce déséquilibre, la migration internationale n'est certes pas la vraie solution ; celle-ci doit avant tout passer par le développement économique et social des pays pauvres. Elle pourrait néanmoins mettre un peu d'huile dans les rouages, apporter, de part et d'autre, certains éléments de réponse aux besoins les plus urgents. On ne peut que s'étonner que, dans un monde qui prône haut et fort les vertus du libéralisme et de la mondialisation, dans un monde où les entraves au commerce des biens et services sont officiellement vouées aux gémonies, les frontières soient au contraire devenues des remparts presque infranchissables pour les candidats à la migration. On a depuis longtemps reconnu aux hommes et aux femmes le droit à une vie aussi longue que le permettent la biologie et la médecine ; on leur a plus récemment reconnu aussi le droit de décider du nombre de leurs enfants. Pourquoi n'auraient-ils pas bientôt le droit de migrer où bon leur semble sur cette planète ? Quoi qu'il en soit, l'Union devra certainement prêter une attention croissante à la question des migrations internationales.*

*Mais cette question des libertés et droits fondamentaux en matière de comportements démographiques me conduit directement à ce quatrième point que, peut-être, vous attendiez moins, mais qui me paraît appeler davantage d'attention de notre part durant les prochaines années : les rapports entre démographie et droits de l'Homme. Je ne me fais aucune illusion à ce sujet. La fin des atteintes aux droits de l'Homme, inscrits depuis plus de 50 ans dans la Déclaration universelle des Nations Unies, n'est pas pour demain. Il me semble pourtant que le XX<sup>e</sup> siècle devrait pouvoir être un siècle de progrès concrets dans ce domaine. Les opinions publiques en sont de plus en plus soucieuses et peu à peu des moyens d'action, encore impensables il y a quelques années, se mettent en place. Je ne parle pas du bras armé de la communauté internationale, trop soumis aux intérêts des plus puissants pour se soucier réellement des droits des plus faibles, mais de cette évocation de plus en plus insistante d'un "droit d'ingérence humanitaire", de la prochaine mise en place, encore bien timide, d'un tribunal pénal international universel, ou encore plus modestement, de la toute nouvelle compétence attribuée aux tribunaux nationaux de certains pays pour juger de tout crime de guerre ou crime contre l'humanité. Et la*

*démographie dans tout cela, pensez-vous ? Nous n'en sommes pas loin. Notre discipline peut en effet apporter sa modeste pierre à cette belle entreprise. Il y a 12 ans déjà, c'était au congrès de New Delhi, avec Thérèse Locoeh et quelques autres, nous avons présenté au Conseil nouvellement élu une requête pour la mise en place d'une commission scientifique sur le thème "démographie et droits de l'Homme". Le Conseil d'alors avait finalement accordé sa priorité à d'autres thèmes. Mais les temps ont changé. De plus en plus, les statisticiens et les démographes sont conscients d'avoir à faire et à dire en ce domaine. L'an passé, par exemple, Bill Seltzer a organisé, lors de la réunion de la PAA de Los Angeles, une passionnante séance sur "Human rights, population statistics and demography". Non seulement la réflexion sur les rapports entre nos méthodes d'investigation et le respect des libertés individuelles reste à approfondir, mais des études faites à l'occasion des horreurs récemment commises en ex-Yougoslavie montraient combien le concours de démographes pouvait être précieux pour la manifestation de la vérité. De la Tchétchénie à l'Afrique centrale, combien de crimes de guerre, combien de crimes contre l'humanité restent non seulement impunis, mais même tout simplement ignorés, du fait que personne ne fait vraiment les comptes. Il me semble que nous ne devrions pas avoir peur d'oser apporter notre contribution à une meilleure connaissance de faits qui, hélas, déshonorent l'humanité, mais dont la simple reconnaissance est déjà en soi un immense progrès sur l'oubli. Nous venons justement d'être saisis, il y a quelques semaines, d'une proposition de Helge Brunborg de créer un groupe de travail sur la démographie des conflits et des violences. Je crois qu'il faut voir plus large et j'ai bien l'intention de proposer au nouveau Conseil de mettre en place une commission sur "démographie et droits de l'Homme".*

*Encore une fois, je vous prie de ne pas prendre ces quelques réflexions pour un programme de quatre ans. Attendons le nouveau Conseil pour en décider. Mais, vous le voyez, ce ne sont pas les pistes de travail qui manquent. Je suis sûr que des prochaines élections sortira une équipe bien décidée à tout faire pour donner à l'Union, à travers ses commissions scientifiques, ses séminaires, ses colloques et congrès, les moyens d'être présente et active au sein de la communauté scientifique internationale, au service de la progression des connaissances sur les sujets les plus actuels de nos sociétés.*

*Je ne voudrais pas terminer sans joindre mes remerciements appuyés à ceux que vient de présenter James Trussell, sans saluer la brillante réussite de ce congrès de Salvador. Côté remerciements, je voudrais tant évoquer un par un tous celles et ceux qui ont travaillé depuis des mois au succès du congrès, mais vous me pardonnerez de ne pas le faire tant ils sont nombreux.*

*Permettez-moi tout de même d'ajouter aux remerciements de James une mention toute spéciale et personnelle pour le secrétariat de l'Union, qui a dû assumer le plus gros de cette tâche au milieu d'une difficile période de transition. Permettez-moi aussi de redire toute mon admiration et toutes mes félicitations à nos collègues brésiliens du Comité national d'organisation ; je crois que je n'offenserai ni Elsa Berquo ni Eduardo Rios Neto, qui en ont brillamment assuré la présidence, en m'attachant à remercier tout particulièrement Maria Coleta Oliveira, pour l'efficacité et le dévouement avec lesquels elle a coordonné l'ensemble des opérations. Côté réussite, je dirai seulement, puisque je crois qu'il y a une assez forte probabilité que le prochain Conseil accepte l'offre du Gouvernement français de tenir notre prochain congrès en France, je dirai tout simplement que mon vœu le plus cher serait que nous puissions vous offrir dans quatre ans un congrès général aussi réussi que celui de Salvador et que notre meilleure chance de réussir serait de recevoir conseils et appuis de nos collègues brésiliens et tout particulièrement de Maria Coleta !*

*Rendez-vous donc dans quatre ans, quelque part en France, pour un 25<sup>e</sup> congrès aussi passionnant et chaleureux que celui de Salvador de Bahia !*

## **Address by the outgoing President, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, at the Opening Ceremony of the XXIVth IUSSP General Conference**

### **Where Are We Heading? Some Demographic Trends During the Twenty-First Century.**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

A brief address from the President of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population has become a tradition at the opening ceremony of the General Population Conference. However, this is not the moment for an overview of the policies adopted and the results achieved during the last four years. The General Secretary, Dr. Wolfgang Lutz, will perform this task at one of the assemblies scheduled to take place during the Conference. Furthermore, I do not consider it appropriate to address any very specific topic as they will be best discussed within the almost 100 thematic sessions of the Con-

ference. I therefore chose to address what we may call the 'New Demographic Pattern'. It is characterized by decreasing fertility and mortality rates, which bears consequences in terms of fast population aging and, probably, an increase in international migration flows.

#### THE NEW DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN

Thirty or forty years ago when current senior demographers were just starting their careers, the field of demography divided the world into two large groups following a schematic view. On one side, there were First World countries with low fertility and mortality rates, and very low, albeit positive, crude and intrinsic growth rates. Zero population growth (ZPG) used to be a goal that was expected to be reached without any external intervention, a permanent stage that would guarantee a stationary stability. On the other side, there were Third World countries marked by high crude birth rates and declining mortality rates, condemned to a tragic demographic explosion. Given the implausible and undesirable positive Malthusian checks that would lead to the increase of mortality rates, Third World countries would have no other alternative to keep up productive investments but enforce a strict birth control policy. Rapid demographic growth was then considered to be not only a barrier to the development of Third World countries, but also a threat to First World countries.

Reality has been proven different from this deterministic view. On the one hand, the so-called First World countries, now named developed countries, have presented fertility rates below replacement level, eliminating the hypothesis that sub-replacement fertility was a temporary phenomenon on the way to a stationary population. On the other hand, the so-called Third World countries, now named developing countries, have presented declining fertility rates, even in those without explicit family planning policies. In many developing countries, such as China, Brazil and Mexico, this decline occurred at a pace that had never been observed among developed countries. Considering the pattern of fertility decline in the developing world - from the most to the least privileged social economic groups - we may assume the hypothesis of convergence of levels, among social economic groups within the same country and within countries of the same region.

Currently, 44% of the world population lives in 51 countries with total fertility rates (TFRs) below replacement levels. The latest projections from the United Nations Population Division predicts

that in 2015, 88 countries will be in the same situation, corresponding to 67% of the world population (UN, 2000). It is clear that both the increase in this proportion and in the number of countries will take place in the developing world. I would like to call the attention to the fact that recent and independent projections up to the middle of the 21st century, based on different methodologies, have forecasted similar figures (The World Bank, United Nations, the Census Bureau of the United States and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis). According to them the world population in 2015 would vary from 7.83 billion (IIASA) to 7.94 billion (UN), whereas in 2050 it would range from 8.80 (IIASA) to 9.32 billion (UN) (Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov, 2001).

According to the medium projection scenario of IIASA, world population would reach its maximum around 2070 with approximately 9 billion people, ending this century with approximately 8.4 billion people. From 2025 to 2050, world population growth would be less than 0.5% per year, while the population of Western and Eastern Europe would be already declining. The last quarter of the 21st century would witness population growth only in North America (Canada and United States), and Latin America, yet at a negligible rate (approximately 3% in 25 years, for each of the Americas). Considering that these are long term projections the values presented indicate just trends. Future international migration flows may lead to a significant change in the spatial distribution of the world population.

The aging process of the population - an inevitable consequence of the decline in fertility rates - was considered an exclusive phenomenon of the developed countries two decades ago. Today, this is a worldwide process. Given the IIASA projections previously mentioned, only Sub-Saharan Africa - which corresponded to 10% of the world population in the year 2000 - would not face an increase in the proportion of elderly in the first half of this century. From 2000 to 2050 the proportion of the world population above age 60 would increase from 10% to 22%. In Northern Africa, it would increase from 10% to 22%; in Latin America, from 8% to 22%; in the Middle East, from 6% to 18%; in Southern Asia, from 7% to 18%. Finally, in China, the elderly population would increase from 10% to 30%. As a comparison, the proportion of elderly in the Western Europe would increase from 20% to 35% over the same period (Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov, 2001).



Therefore, around year 2050, the proportion of population above age 60 in the developing countries would be roughly the same as what is observed in Western Europe today. It must be emphasized that the aging process in the developing world will be more rapid than the one observed in the developed countries, especially in the European populations, due to three main reasons:

1. the proportion of individuals in the younger cohorts was lower in the European populations when their aging process started;
2. the decline in fertility in those populations happened at a much slower pace than those currently observed in the developing world; and
3. the mean age of the fertility distribution as well as the mean age of cohort maternity in developing countries are both lower than those of the European women, leading to a much faster change of the age structure.

Until recently the remarkable decline in mortality rates had had little impact on the proportional age distributions. However, future declines in mortality due to developments in bio-genetics will necessarily be concentrated on the more advanced ages, possibly leading to a significant increase in longevity. None of the projections previously discussed included in the hypothesis these future developments.

If attained, these mortality declines will represent an additional increase in the size of the old population, with almost no impact on the number of persons in the economically productive and childbearing ages. This means that there will be no significant change to the net reproduction rates nor to the mean age of cohort maternity. The growth rate (intrinsic growth rate) will not change due to the increasing longevity, but will act over a larger and older population. Despite the observed and future gains in mortality there is still a fact that results in pain, loss and tragedy both at individual and social levels. The AIDS epidemic, could not be forgotten in this address. Until recently it was restricted to some groups from which most of us, thanks to prejudice, felt distant. It is now time for us to join the fight against this terrible disease. As professionals, we may join the efforts to estimate the trends of its prevalence and incidence, as well as understand its determinants. As citizens, we must join the efforts towards the extermination of this epidemic through national cohe-

sion and international solidarity. The majority of the countries with the highest incidence and prevalence of AIDS are poor and have no economic or institutional conditions to face the disease without international support. The new drugs developed in laboratories from developed countries are required and must be made available to those infected with the HIV, a condition that will only be possible if the price to be paid is feasible.

To illustrate this tragedy that reaches many populations today, I would like to present some figures from the recent publication of the UN Population Division titled "The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS" (UN, 1999). As a new epidemic, its effects cannot be precisely estimated, and are subject to a reasonable margin of errors. However, the numbers are so significant that errors in projections do not diminish the urge to combat the disease.

In 2000-2005 the Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) in countries with more than 10% of HIV prevalence (adult population) will be equal to 18.7 per thousand, compared to 9.4 per thousand in the absence of the HIV epidemic. In addition, these countries' 2015 estimated population of 190.6 million will probably be of only 163 million due to the HIV incidence. This represents a deficit of 27.6 million individuals in their total population (15%) due to the deaths and their indirect effects, such as the unborn children of dead parents. The population of the 34 countries analyzed by the study (29 African, 3 Asian, and 2 Latin American) is projected to be equal to 2,204 billion in 2015, 80 million less than it would be were it not for the projected impact of HIV. This tragedy could be avoided through a worldwide effort towards awareness of preventive measures, as well as of support to those already infected, ensuring them a more dignified and healthier life, including free access to modern therapy. In many countries, AIDS adds to a scenario already facing a series of health-related problems such as tuberculosis, malaria, diseases related to low (or lack of) immunization and poor sanitary conditions.

Over the next decades world demographic dynamics will be characterized, above all, by near-zero population growth and accelerating aging. In this context, developed countries will experience negative natural growth rates with increasing old dependency ratios, and higher in-migration flows. A recent study of the United Nations Population Division - "Replacement Migration" - shows that between 1995 and 2050, Europe would need, on average, an annual positive net migration of 2.9 million people, to keep constant

the size of the population in the economically productive ages (15 to 64 years). In the case of Russia, the figure would be 650,000 per year, whereas for the European Union it would be 1.4 million. Japan would need 609,000 per year to avoid the decrease of the working age population. If the goal is to keep constant their potential support ratio (number of persons 15-64 years-old per each person 65 or older), then the required average annual positive net international migratory flows would be of 25.2 million, for Europe; 12.7 million, for the European Union; 4.7 million, for Russia; and 10.1 million, for Japan! (United Nations 2000a, Table IV.4).

It is not realistic to believe that either of these scenarios will happen. Cultural and technological changes will certainly occur, implying a lower demand for immigrants than described before. In any event, despite the public opinion opposition, an increasing demand for international migrants will probably take place, as already observed in some European countries.

This increasing demand for international migrants will attract younger and higher educated populations. Therefore, we can expect the migration pattern to change from the current scenario, characterized by the relief of poverty in the sending countries through the emigration process, to a new scenario marked by the exit of the most educated population. Thus, in addition to large investments in education, developing countries will need to adopt effective policies to maintain their educated workforce on competitive terms. Otherwise, developing countries will lose their best human resources to the developed countries. If this comes to pass, international migration may change from a way of mitigating social inequalities to a process of increasing socioeconomic gaps between developed and developing societies.

In the last decades, during international governmental meetings, including those organized by the United Nations, developed countries have avoided the debate on people's individual rights to move freely among nations and to choose where to live. The recognition of this right would produce as a consequence what many consider utopia: open frontiers to international migration. It is not unrealistic to assume that in one or two decades several developing countries, concerned by loss of skilled working-age migrants for the developed world, will take a similar position against the free movement between countries, perhaps imposing restrictive exit conditions or claiming for financial compensation.

## CONCLUSION

We may expect the convergence of fertility levels in the world, despite the uncertainties regarding the limit of fertility decline in the developing countries, and the future of fertility rates in the populations that have already reached below replacement levels. Despite the AIDS epidemic and the increasing mortality in some Eastern European countries, it seems that mortality rates will decrease all over the world, in particular, at more advanced ages.

Concerning the developing countries, the fertility transition opens a window of opportunity to mitigate or even solve social problems, such as those related to education, nutrition and children's health. They should constitute part of the strategy to face the challenge of the increasing economic burden caused by the aging process. The challenges are inevitable, although the opportunities may or may not be missed.

The pace of the fertility transition will be fast in developing countries. The proportional change in the fertility rates is comparable to the one observed in the developed world during a longer period of time. Finally, I would like to quote the words of Professor David Reher, in a recent paper presented in a IUSSP Seminar on the History of the World Population in the Second Millenium hosted in Florence: "The breakneck pace of the demographic transition among the countries who initiated their own transformations at a later date will not leave these countries with the same sort of ample margin for economic growth and social transformations. For them, a situation of explosive population growth, with extremely young populations will become one of rapidly aging populations. This is not a matter of opinion or an educated guess, but rather a very likely scenario for the not-too-distant future in much of the world. The window of opportunity for the demographic transition contribution to the process of social and economic modernization in much of the world will be a short one indeed" (Reher, 2001). I would like to add to David's words that, exactly because the window is narrower than the one in the developed world, it has to be efficiently used, since the opportunities will vanish fast and the challenges will always remain.

## ***Allocution de José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, Président sortant, à la cérémonie d'ouverture du XXIVe Congrès Général de l'UIESP***

***Vers quoi allons-nous ? Quelques tendances démographiques pour le vingt et unième siècle.***

### ***INTRODUCTION***

*Une brève allocution du Président de l'Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population lors de la cérémonie d'ouverture du Congrès Général est dorénavant une tradition. Toutefois, ce n'est pas le moment de passer en revue les politiques adoptées et les résultats obtenus au cours des quatre dernières années. Le Secrétaire Général, Wolfgang Lutz, s'acquittera de cette tâche lors de l'une des assemblées programmées pendant le Congrès. De plus, je considère qu'il n'est pas opportun de traiter ici de l'un ou l'autre des sujets particuliers qui seront mieux traités au sein des presque 100 séances thématiques du Congrès. En conséquence, j'ai choisi de parler de ce que nous pourrions appeler le "nouveau régime démographique". Il est caractérisé par une baisse des taux de fécondité et de mortalité qui provoque un vieillissement rapide de la population et probablement une augmentation des flux migratoires internationaux.*

### ***LE NOUVEAU RÉGIME DÉMOGRAPHIQUE***

*Il y a trente ou quarante ans, lorsque les aînés d'entre nous démarraient tout juste leur carrière de démographes, la démographie divisait le monde en deux grands groupes de manière schématique. D'une part, on trouvait les pays du "Premier Monde", avec des taux de fécondité et de mortalité bas et des taux de croissance brute et intrinsèque très bas, quoique positifs. La croissance zéro de la population ("ZPG") était alors un objectif que l'on pensait pouvoir atteindre sans intervention extérieure, un état permanent qui garantirait une stationnarité à long terme. Les pays du Tiers Monde, d'autre part, marqués par des taux de natalité élevés et des taux de mortalité en baisse, étaient condamnés à une tragique explosion démographique. Étant donné que les "freins positifs" malthusiens, qui provoqueraient une augmentation des taux de mortalité, étaient peu probables et peu souhaitables, les pays du Tiers Monde n'avaient pas d'autre alternative pour maintenir leurs investissements productifs que de mettre en place une politique*

*rigoureuse de contrôle des naissances. La croissance démographique rapide était alors considérée non seulement comme un frein au développement des pays du Tiers Monde, mais également comme une menace envers les pays du Premier Monde.*

*La réalité s'est montrée différente de cette vision déterministe. D'une part, les pays dits du Premier Monde, appelés aujourd'hui pays développés, ont présenté des taux de fécondité inférieurs au seuil de remplacement des générations, infirmant ainsi l'hypothèse selon laquelle la fécondité en dessous du niveau de remplacement serait un phénomène temporaire sur le chemin vers l'état stationnaire. D'autre part, les pays dits du Tiers Monde, aujourd'hui "en voie de développement", ont présenté des taux de fécondité en baisse, même certains d'entre eux qui n'avaient pas adopté une politique de planning familial explicite. Dans de nombreux pays en voie de développement, tels que la Chine, le Brésil et le Mexique, cette baisse s'est opérée à un rythme jamais observé dans les pays développés. Compte tenu du schéma suivi par la baisse de la fécondité dans le monde en voie de développement - depuis les groupes socio-économiques les plus privilégiés jusqu'aux moins favorisés - nous pouvons accepter l'hypothèse de la convergence des niveaux entre groupes socio-économiques d'un même pays et entre pays d'une même région.*

*De nos jours, 44 % de la population mondiale vit dans 51 pays où l'indice conjoncturel de fécondité est en dessous du seuil de remplacement. Les dernières projections de la Division de la Population des Nations Unies prévoient qu'en 2015, 88 pays, représentant 67 % de la population mondiale, seront dans ce cas (UN, 2000). Il est clair que l'augmentation de cette proportion et celle du nombre de pays concernés aura lieu dans le monde en voie de développement. Je souhaiterais attirer l'attention sur le fait que des projections récentes et indépendantes, allant jusqu'au milieu du 21<sup>e</sup> siècle et fondées sur différentes méthodes, ont prévu des chiffres similaires (Banque Mondiale, Nations Unies, Bureau du Recensement des États-Unis et International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis). Selon leurs résultats, la population mondiale en 2015 se situerait entre 7,83 (IIASA) et 7,94 milliards (ONU), alors qu'en 2050, elle oscillerait entre 8,80 (IIASA) et 9,32 milliards (ONU) (Lutz, Sanderson et Scherbov, 2001).*

*Selon le scénario médian de l'IIASA, la population mondiale atteindrait son maximum vers 2070, avec environ 9 milliards d'individus, et finirait ce siècle avec approximativement 8,4 milliards. De 2025 à 2050, la croissance de la population mondiale devrait être de moins de 0,5 % par an, et la population de l'Europe, de l'Ouest comme de l'Est, serait déjà en baisse. Au cours du dernier quart du 21<sup>e</sup> siècle, la population ne serait*

*encore croissante qu'en Amérique du Nord (Canada et États-Unis) et en Amérique Latine, mais à un taux négligeable (environ 3 % en 25 ans, pour chacune des deux Amériques). Étant donné qu'il s'agit de projections à long terme, ces chiffres ne sont que des indications de tendances. Les flux migratoires internationaux futurs pourraient entraîner des changements significatifs de la répartition géographique de la population mondiale.*

*Le processus de vieillissement de la population, conséquence inévitable de la baisse des taux de fécondité, était considéré, il y a vingt ans, comme un phénomène caractéristique des pays développés. Aujourd'hui, c'est un processus planétaire. Selon les projections de l'IIASA mentionnées précédemment, seule l'Afrique sub-saharienne, qui représentait 10 % de la population mondiale en 2000, n'aurait pas à faire face à une augmentation de la proportion de personnes âgées pendant la première moitié de ce siècle. De 2000 à 2050, la proportion des plus de 60 ans dans la population mondiale devrait augmenter de 10 % à 22 %. En Afrique du Nord, elle devrait augmenter de 10 % à 22 % ; en Amérique Latine de 8 % à 22 % ; au Moyen Orient de 6 % à 18 % ; en Asie du Sud, de 7 % à 18 %. Finalement, en Chine, la population âgée augmenterait de 10 % à 30 %. En comparaison, la proportion des personnes âgées en Europe de l'Ouest augmenterait de 20 % à 35 % au cours de la même période (Lutz, Sanderson et Scherbov, 2001).*

*Ainsi, vers l'année 2050, la proportion de la population âgée de plus de 60 ans dans les pays en voie de développement devrait être à peu près identique à celle qui prévaut actuellement en Europe de l'Ouest. Il faut souligner que le processus de vieillissement dans le monde en voie de développement sera plus rapide que celui qui a été observé dans les pays développés, notamment dans les populations européennes, pour trois raisons principales :*

- 1. lorsque le processus de vieillissement a commencé dans les populations européennes, la proportion d'individus dans les cohortes jeunes était plus faible,*
- 2. la baisse de la fécondité de ces populations s'est faite à un rythme beaucoup plus lent que celle qui est observée actuellement dans les pays en voie de développement,*
- 3. dans les pays en voie de développement, l'âge moyen à la maternité du moment et l'âge moyen à la maternité dans les générations sont tous deux inférieurs à ceux des femmes européennes et provoquent un changement beaucoup plus rapide de la structure par âge.*

*Jusqu'à récemment, la baisse considérable des taux de mortalité a eu peu d'impact sur les structures par âge. Toutefois, les baisses futures de la mortalité liées au développement de la biogénétique seront nécessairement concentrées sur les âges les plus avancés et conduiront peut-être à une augmentation significative de l'espérance de vie. Aucune des projections présentées plus haut n'a inclus ces développements futurs dans ses hypothèses. Si ces baisses de mortalité se réalisent, elles provoqueront une augmentation supplémentaire du volume de la population âgée et n'auront presque aucun impact sur le nombre des individus aux âges de reproduction et d'activité économique. Cela signifie qu'il n'y aura pas de changement significatif des taux nets de reproduction ni des âges moyens à la maternité dans les générations. Le taux de croissance (intrinsèque) ne sera pas modifié par l'augmentation de l'espérance de vie, mais agira sur une population plus importante et plus âgée.*

*Malgré les améliorations observées et futures des taux de mortalité, il reste un élément qui engendre douleur, malheur et tragédie, tant au niveau individuel que social. L'épidémie du sida ne saurait être oubliée dans cette allocution. Jusqu'à récemment, elle se limitait à quelques groupes dont la plupart d'entre nous se sentaient éloignés, à cause de nos préjugés. Il est temps pour nous de rejoindre le combat contre cette terrible maladie. En tant que professionnels, nous pourrions nous joindre aux efforts déployés pour estimer les tendances de sa prévalence et de son incidence ainsi que pour comprendre ses déterminants. En tant que citoyens, nous devons nous associer à l'entreprise d'extermination de cette épidémie par la cohésion nationale et la solidarité internationale. La majorité des pays qui connaissent l'incidence et la prévalence les plus importantes du sida sont pauvres et ne remplissent pas les conditions économiques et institutionnelles nécessaires pour faire face à la maladie sans soutien international. Les nouveaux médicaments mis au point dans les laboratoires des pays développés doivent être mis à la disposition des personnes infectées par le VIH, condition qui ne sera réalisable que si leur prix est raisonnable.*

*Afin d'illustrer cette tragédie qui touche tant de populations aujourd'hui, j'aimerais présenter quelques chiffres tirés d'une publication récente de la Division de la Population de l'ONU intitulée "L'impact démographique du VIH/sida" (ONU, 1999). S'agissant d'une nouvelle épidémie, ses effets ne peuvent être estimés avec précision et sont soumis à une certaine marge d'erreur. Toutefois, les chiffres sont tellement énormes que les erreurs de projection ne diminuent pas l'urgence de combattre la maladie.*

*En 2000-2005, le taux brut de mortalité des pays à plus de 10 % de*



*prévalence du VIH (population adulte) sera égal à 18,7 pour mille, contre 9,4 pour mille en l'absence d'épidémie de VIH. De plus, la population prévue de ces pays en 2015 sera probablement réduite de 190,6 millions à 163 millions à cause du VIH. Cela représente un déficit de 27,6 millions d'individus sur la population totale, soit 15 %, dû aux décès et à leurs effets indirects tels que les enfants qui ne viendront pas au monde à cause de la disparition prématurée de leurs parents. On prévoit que la population des 34 pays analysés par l'étude (29 pays d'Afrique, 3 d'Asie et 2 d'Amérique Latine) atteindra 2,204 milliards in 2015, soit 80 millions de moins que sans l'impact prévu du VIH. Cette tragédie pourrait être évitée par un effort planétaire de sensibilisation aux mesures préventives et d'aide aux populations déjà infectées, pour leur procurer une vie plus digne, une meilleure santé, et en particulier l'accès gratuit à la thérapeutique moderne.*

*Dans de nombreux pays, le sida s'ajoute à un scénario où l'on est déjà confronté à toute une série de problèmes de santé, tels que la tuberculose, la malaria, les maladies liées à une immunité déficiente (ou nulle) et à de mauvaises conditions sanitaires.*

*Au cours des prochaines décennies, la dynamique démographique mondiale sera surtout caractérisée par une croissance proche de zéro et une accélération du vieillissement. Dans un tel contexte, les pays développés vont connaître des taux de croissance naturelle négatifs avec des rapports de dépendance des personnes âgées de 65 ans et plus en augmentation et des flux d'immigration plus importants. Une étude récente de la Division de la Population de l'ONU - "Les migrations de remplacement" - montre qu'entre 1995 et 2050, l'Europe aurait besoin, en moyenne, d'une migration nette annuelle positive de 2,9 millions de personnes pour maintenir constant le volume de la population des tranches d'âge d'activité économique (15 à 64 ans). Dans le cas de la Russie, ce chiffre serait de 650 000 par an, et, pour l'Union Européenne, 1,4 millions. Le Japon aurait besoin de 609 000 immigrants nets par an pour éviter la diminution de la population en âge de travailler. Pour maintenir constant le rapport de dépendance (ou le nombre de personnes entre 15 et 64 ans pour chaque personne âgée de 65 ans ou plus), l'immigration internationale nette annuelle devrait être de 25,2 millions pour l'Europe, 12,7 millions pour l'Union Européenne, 4,7 millions pour la Russie et 10,1 millions pour le Japon ! (ONU, 2000a, Tableau IV.4).*

*Il n'est pas réaliste de penser que l'un de ces scénarios va se dérouler tel quel. Des changements culturels et technologiques vont certainement survenir, impliquant une moindre demande d'immigrants. Quoi qu'il en soit, malgré l'opposition de l'opinion publique, il y aura probablement une*

*demande croissante de migrants internationaux, comme on peut déjà le voir dans certains pays européens.*

*Cette demande accrue de migrants internationaux va attirer des populations plus jeunes et mieux formées. Par conséquent, il faut s'attendre à un changement du type de migration : du schéma actuel, où l'émigration est vue comme une solution à la pauvreté dans les pays d'origine, vers un nouveau schéma, caractérisé par l'exode de la population la plus diplômée. Ainsi, outre des investissements importants dans la formation, les pays en voie de développement vont devoir adopter des politiques efficaces en termes de compétitivité afin de retenir leur main-d'œuvre qualifiée. Sinon, ces pays abandonneront leurs meilleurs atouts humains aux pays développés. Si cela venait à se produire, la migration internationale pourrait cesser d'être un moyen pour réduire les inégalités sociales et devenir un processus creusant encore le fossé socio-économique entre pays en voie de développement et pays développés.*

*Au cours des dernières décennies, lors de divers sommets politiques internationaux, y compris ceux qu'ont organisés les Nations Unies, les pays développés ont évité le débat sur le droit des personnes à se déplacer librement dans le monde et à choisir où elles souhaitent vivre. La reconnaissance de ce droit produirait ce que beaucoup considèrent comme une utopie : l'ouverture des frontières à la migration internationale. Or, il n'est pas irréaliste de penser que, dans une ou deux décennies, certains pays en voie de développement, inquiets de la perte de leur main-d'œuvre qualifiée au profit des pays développés, prendront une position similaire contre la libre circulation entre pays en imposant peut-être des conditions restrictives de sortie ou en réclamant des compensations financières.*

## **CONCLUSION**

*Malgré les incertitudes concernant la limite de la baisse de la fécondité dans les pays en voie de développement et l'avenir de la fécondité dans les populations où elle est déjà en deçà du seuil de remplacement, nous pouvons nous attendre à la convergence des niveaux de fécondité dans le monde. En dépit de l'épidémie de sida et de l'augmentation de la mortalité dans certains pays de l'Europe de l'Est, il semble que les taux de mortalité vont diminuer dans le monde entier, notamment aux âges les plus avancés.*

*Quant aux pays en voie de développement, la transition de la fécondité introduit la possibilité de réduire, voire résoudre, des problèmes sociaux liés, entre autres, à la formation, à l'alimentation, et à la santé des enfants. Ceci devrait faire partie de la stratégie à adopter face au défi de la charge économique croissante engendrée par le processus du vieillissement. Les*

*défis sont inévitables, mais les opportunités qu'ils ouvrent peuvent être saisies ou manquées.*

*Le rythme de la transition de la fécondité sera rapide dans les pays en voie de développement. L'évolution relative des taux de fécondité est comparable à celle des pays développés sur une période plus longue. Finalement, j'aimerais citer le Professeur David Reher qui a dit, dans un exposé récent présenté lors d'un séminaire de l'UIESP sur l'histoire de la population mondiale pendant le second millénaire, à Florence : "Le rythme effréné de la transition démographique dans les pays qui ont commencé leur transformation plus tard ne leur laissera pas autant de marge pour la croissance économique et le changement social. Pour ces pays, une situation de croissance explosive avec des populations extrêmement jeunes va laisser la place à une situation de populations en voie de vieillissement accéléré. Cela n'est ni une question d'opinion ni une conjecture savante, mais plutôt un scénario hautement probable pour un avenir assez proche dans une grande partie du monde. La marge de manœuvre disponible pour que la transition démographique contribue au processus de modernisation sociale et économique sera, dans une grande partie du monde, assurément très réduite." (Reher, 2001). Je souhaiterais ajouter aux paroles de David que, justement, puisque la marge est plus étroite que celle du monde développé, elle doit être utilisée efficacement, car les opportunités vont vite s'évanouir et les défis seront toujours là.*

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## **Nominations Committee 2002-2005** ***Comité des Nominations 2002-2005***

### **Congratulations to the new Nominations Committee Members** ***Félicitations aux nouveaux membres du Comité des Nominations***

José Alberto de Carvalho (Brazil / *Brésil*), Antonio Golini (Italy / *Italie*), Gavin Jones (Australia / *Australie*), Yaw Ofosu (Ghana), Julieta Quilodrán (Mexico / *Mexique*), Jacques Véron (France), Susan Watkins (USA)

## **New IUSSP Council 2002-2005** ***Nouveau Conseil de l'UIESP 2002-2005***

### **Congratulations to the new Council Members** ***Félicitations aux nouveaux membres du Conseil***

#### **Elected Members / *Membres élus***

President / *Président* :  
VALLIN, Jacques (France)

Vice-President / *Vice-Président* :  
ZLOTNIK, Hania (Mexico / *Mexique*)

Secretary General and Treasurer / *Secrétaire Général et Trésorier* :  
KRITZ, Mary (USA)

Council / *Conseil* :  
BASU, Alaka (India / *Inde*)  
CASELLI, Graziella (Italy / *Italie*)  
CASTERLINE, John (USA)  
COLEMAN, David (United Kingdom / *Royaume-Uni*)  
McDONALD, Peter (Australia / *Australie*)  
SATHAR, Zeba (Pakistan)  
SIMMONS, Alan (Canada)  
TRUSSELL, James (USA)  
YI, Zeng (China / *Chine*)

## **General Assembly** ***Assemblée Générale***

### **General Assembly of the IUSSP**

Salvador (Brazil), 20 and 22 August 2001

#### **First meeting**

The first meeting of the IUSSP General Assembly was opened on August 20, 2001 at 12:50 by IUSSP President, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, drawing briefly on his opening address to the Conference in his welcome. The first order of business was adoption of the agenda. The purpose of the first meeting of the General Assembly was to inform members of the names of persons put forward by Council for the next Committee on Nominations and of the possibility to put in additional names. The names submitted by Council were as follows: José Alberto Magno de Carvalho (Brazil), Susan Watkins (USA), Julieta Quilodrán (Mexico), Kannan Navaneetham (India), Sergei Scherbov (Russia), Sri Moertiningsih Adioetomo (Indonesia), Yaw Oforu (Ghana), and Antonio Golini (Italy). Requirements for submitting additional candidatures and voting procedures were explained.

The first meeting of the IUSSP General Assembly ended at 13:15.

#### **Second meeting**

The second meeting of the IUSSP General Assembly was opened on August 22, 2001 at 18:30 by IUSSP President, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho. The first order of business was the report of activities by the Secretary General and Treasurer, Wolfgang Lutz.

#### **Address by the Secretary General and Treasurer, Wolfgang Lutz**

At the first meeting of the newly elected Council in Liège in February 1998, the state of the Union was discussed in a rather fundamental manner. Several long standing Union traditions were questioned and the need to make the Union fit for a 21st century operation was the dominating theme. The primary goal was to efficiently address the core objectives of the Union as stated in Article 1 of our constitution: "...having as its aim the furtherance of the science of demography. To achieve this aim, the Union shall foster relations between

persons engaged in the study of demography in all countries of the world, and stimulate interest in demographic matters among governments, national and international organisations, scientific bodies and the general public." Most of the new initiatives taken over the past three and a half years directly relate to these main objectives of the Union as stated in our constitution.

### **1. Entering the electronic age**

[www.iussp.org](http://www.iussp.org) has hopefully become a frequently used combination of letters by most Union members. The web site was up and running in mid-1998 and has since quickly become the main means of communication between headquarters and the membership, concerning our scientific committees, working groups and other Union activities including this General Conference. The site is constantly being improved and we hope that it will be used even more in the future. Particularly the part restricted to members with the on-line membership directory, etc., does not yet seem to be used to its full potential. To remind you of the password (the year the Union was founded) we are distributing an IUSSP mouse pad to all members.

This form of almost instantaneous communication around the world seems to be a very appropriate tool for achieving our constitutional goal to "...foster relations between persons engaged in the study of demography in all countries of the world." We were initially concerned that some of our members in developing countries would not have access and would therefore be excluded from important Union-related information. We even reserved some funds to help members get on-line. But this turned out to be unnecessary because access in developing countries, especially for members related to research institutes, has been improving very rapidly. In fact, most of the few members who still do not have e-mail and internet access are members in rich countries who by choice do not want to use this technology. And as you have seen, we will continue to mail out hard copies of the Bulletin and other important information.

We are also exploring whether electronic communication could in the future complement or even partly replace the current mode of operation of our scientific committees and working groups. With financial assistance from the MacArthur Foundation and institutional support from CIESIN, we have set up a web based research network on the topic of population and environment, a field that seems to be particularly heterogeneous and could benefit from the

broadest possible input (visit the website at [www.populationenvironmentresearch.org](http://www.populationenvironmentresearch.org)). The great advantage of such an approach seems to be that it is very inclusive and gives all interested members and even other scientists the possibility to participate in the scientific activities of this network, thus responding to the long standing accusation that Union committees were too exclusive and would not involve all interested members. On the other hand, it seems to be difficult to seriously communicate with people whom you have never seen. Our experiments with cyber seminars have shown that the degree of personal commitment to a seminar on the internet is much lower than when one travels to a distant location and is with a group of colleagues for a few days. This question needs to be further examined and tested so that the next Council can draw conclusions for the future mode of operation of our scientific committees and working groups.

## **2. Regional networking**

Another way of improving communications among demographers from different countries is the fostering of existing or the establishment of new regional population networks. It is often easier and more fruitful to exchange views with colleagues in neighbouring countries than to go immediately to the global level. In many world regions, regional population associations exist. One big continent where such an association does not yet exist is Asia. For this reason the Union decided to join the creation of the Asian Population Network (APN) in collaboration with the Wellcome Trust which funded the "Asian MetaCentre for Population and Sustainable Development" (see web site [www.populationasia.org](http://www.populationasia.org)). This Asian Population Network is organising 2-3 substantive seminars - in some cases together with existing IUSSP committees - with a majority of the participants coming from the Asian region. This initiative also has resulted in the planning of the first Asian regional IUSSP conference with an IOC under the leadership of our past president, Mercedes Concepcion. The conference will take place in June 2002 in Bangkok.

It should be mentioned that the Union took part in the African Population Conference in Durban in December 1999, and in the European Population Conference in Helsinki in June 2001. We also had information sessions and booths at several PAAs.




### 3. Student associates and restructuring of dues

Following suggestions from our membership, the Council decided to create the special category of "IUSSP student associate." This status does not require formal election, as does full membership, and does not entail membership privileges as stated in the constitution, but involves the student associate into the IUSSP scientific network. The hope is that after completion of their studies, these student associates will become full members. And this is already starting to happen.


We also decided to restructure the dues in a way that the basic dues would only include journals that are given to Union members free of charge. This unfortunately included the discontinuation of the automatic mailing of *Population Studies* to all members because of the heavy financial burden involved. But for *Population Studies* as well as for several other good journals in the field we negotiated reduced subscription rates for Union members.

The most recent count of paying full members and student associates as of 12 August 2001 is 1906, which is an all-time high for the Union. Below are age-sex pyramids of current Union membership as well as future Union membership under alternative scenarios. Perhaps the main message to emerge from these pyramids is that the Union, like the world around us, is ageing. It is crucial that we continue our efforts to attract the best young researchers into the Union.


**Figure 1. IUSSP Population in 2001**




**Figure 2. IUSSP Population in 2021 according to high membership scenario (in-migration/year: 90 men and 90 women - out-migration/year: 20 men and 20 women)**



**Figure 3. IUSSP Population in 2021 according to medium membership scenario (in-migration/year: 60 men and 30 women - out-migration/year: 20 men and 20 women)**



**Figure 4. IUSSP Population in 2021 according to low membership scenario (in-migration/year: 30 men and 15 women - out-migration/year: 20 men and 20 women)**



#### 4. Publications

Inappropriately long delays in the publication of our books with Oxford University Press (OUP), and the fact that a high proportion of members never see these books due to their high prices, led the Council to consider the possibility of a Union journal. This is a difficult issue because it would imply direct competition with existing journals in the field. After careful consideration the plan was postponed, and the priority has now shifted to working out an arrangement with OUP that will be significantly more expeditious and give members access to reprints of at least the most important contributions. Negotiations with OUP are currently under way.

#### 5. Science-policy communication

Another constitutional goal of the Union is to inform governments as well as national and international organisations about population issues. Traditionally, interaction at the international level culminated around the decadal World Population Conferences. The

intensity of science-policy interaction in these fora has, however, been declining over time. Especially in the context of the Cairo 1994 Conference, there have been frustrations about the lack of such interaction as clearly expressed in the presidential address in the last General Assembly in Beijing in 1997. The new Council took this up and issued a science-policy statement for the Cairo+5 series of events in 1999. In this statement the Council stresses the need to consider the macro-level implications of population trends in addition to the concerns about individual rights and individual welfare. The Council also announces that it will make more efforts to summarise and communicate to the full membership and to the public the results of IUSSP scientific committees and working groups and to initiate a series of debates on hot scientifically contested topics.

Most recently the IUSSP was involved in setting up a "Global Science Panel on Population and Environment" (largely following the model of a US-NAS scientific panel) in co-operation with IIASA and the United Nations University and with funding from the government of Austria, UNFPA, UNU, IIASA and the MacArthur Foundation. Nafis Sadik and Maurice Strong (the chair of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit) jointly serve as patrons of this Panel; Wolfgang Lutz and Mahendra Shah serve as co-ordinators. The Panel recently had its first meeting at NIDI in the Netherlands. The main purpose of the Panel is to produce scientific input about the role of the population variable in sustainable development to be introduced at the highest political level as input to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Since this UN conference is not simply Rio+10 but has a broader focus on sustainable development, and since there probably will not be a major Cairo+10 conference in 2004, this Johannesburg summit seems to be the appropriate place to scientifically consider the macro-level implications of population on development and environment. In this context a main task will be to make sure that the way from Rio to Johannesburg goes through Cairo and that the Cairo consensus finds its way into the Johannesburg agenda. A draft statement will be broadly discussed in a cyber seminar this fall (conducted by the above mentioned population and environment research network PERN) and will be published next spring. It will be a statement of the Panel members in their personal capacities and not one of any of the institutions involved.

As to the summary and communication of IUSSP research findings, we are just at the beginning of a more lengthy process. We have

already produced and widely distributed a separate volume summarising the Union's gender-related work over the past decade. Other research areas are expected to follow. The permanent poster display of IUSSP scientific activities in the main lobby of this conference centre is another step in this direction. Finally, the plenary debate sessions every afternoon during this conference are an attempt towards public discussion of scientifically contested questions.

## **6. Move of Union headquarters**

In order to meet its constitutional goals, the IUSSP needs to have a solid and sustainable financial basis and an efficient headquarters operation. When reviewing the state of Union affairs in early 1998, the Council concluded that our longer-run balance of expected income vis a vis fixed expenditures was a source of concern. This was related to the question of the location of headquarters because the government of Belgium had stopped supporting the Union. As a consequence in February 1998, the Council decided to invite other countries to make offers for financial support in return for moving the Union headquarters. The hope was that this would put pressure on the Belgian government to come up with funds and in turn make a move unnecessary. By the time of the next Council meeting in December 1998, two concrete proposals (one from the Austrian and one from the French governments) were on the table. The government of Belgium had not responded to the invitation to resume funding. At this point the Council decided to appoint a group of three distinguished Union members (Jane Menken, Massimo Livi-Bacci and Guillaume Wunsch) to take a closer look at the three proposals (INED, IIASA and staying in Liège without Belgian funding) and report back to the Council. Their report concluded that "...it would be in the long-term interest of the Union to move to Paris, although we fear the near term consequences." At the November 1999 Council meeting in Liège, it was decided to put the long-term interest over the short-term problems and move the headquarters to Paris, unless the Belgian government would come up with funds by April 2000. Despite some last minute efforts by Belgian IUSSP members, the deadline passed and it was decided to move headquarters operation to Paris by 1 January 2001.

Since none of the staff members wanted to move to Paris, this change of headquarters unfortunately involved separation from most of our experienced staff (only Pierre Alderson continued to work for

us on the co-ordination of the 2001 conference). In May 2000 our Executive Secretary, Jane Verrall, informed us that for personal reasons, she would rather return to England than move to Paris and build up a new team, as had been planned. In consensus with each individual staff member, we succeeded to work out a plan of indemnity payments and termination of work (in some cases early retirement). As a result, a significant thinning of headquarters staff during the second half of the year took place and undoubtedly caused some discontinuities in the services to our members and committees. I apologise for any inconveniences this may have caused. But I am happy to announce that over the past months, a new and much smaller team under the dynamic leadership of Landis MacKellar has brought things under control. They have managed to establish a new mode of operation, even under the enormous pressure of simultaneously preparing for this conference. Admittedly, the timing of the move was not ideal, but the process developed its own dynamics, and we are looking confidently towards the future.

On behalf of the Council I would like to express our thanks and highest appreciation to our former staff members in Liège for their long, dedicated, and faithful service to the Union. Let's give them a hand.

I would like to welcome our new staff members in Paris: Landis MacKellar (USA), Elizabeth Omoluabi (Nigeria), Catrin Jones (Wales), and Delphine Lebugle (France). I would like to thank them, together with Pierre Alderson, for the smooth organisation of this conference and wish them good luck for the future. This is a time of change and re-orientation for the Union and any suggestions by the membership for a new and more efficient mode of operation are most welcome. Please send us any suggestions you may have.

Since the motivation for the move was primarily financial, it is worth summarising where we stand financially after the move. The Union is expecting to record a significant surplus for the year 2001, even without taking the sale of the Liège house into consideration (that money will be put in a reserve account). This, combined with the surplus recorded last year (which largely resulted from utilising redundancy provisions associated with the termination of staff), should be enough to get our cumulative fund balance back in the black for the first time since 1997. It is worth noting that our fixed annual costs (which is mostly made up by the payroll) is now only less than one third of what it used to be in Liège. The money saved will be invested

in the Union's scientific activities. As a result, we were able to support travel expenses for more than 130 colleagues (mostly from developing countries) to Salvador, on top of the travel support provided by the Brazilian hosts.

### **Brief statements of activities of Committees, Working Groups, Research Networks and other activities**

An innovation of this year's General Assembly was that reports of IUSSP research groups were made via posters instead of statements to the General Assembly. Members were invited to make sure they spent time in the IUSSP poster display area. All the latest information regarding the Committees and Working Groups can be found on the IUSSP website ([www.iussp.org](http://www.iussp.org)).

### **Presentation of Union accounts and nomination of auditors**

The report on Union accounts for 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 prepared by Ernst and Young, auditors, was presented. A brief summary set of figures is given here in the accompanying table. The audited accounts are available from the IUSSP Secretariat in Paris. It was decided without discussion to maintain Ernst and Young as the auditor for the next four years.

#### *Income and Expenditures, 1997-2000 (from audited accounts)*

	1997	1998	1999	2000
<b>Revenues</b>	\$1,496,825	\$1,134,400	\$968,419	\$898,548
Grant income	\$1,003,583	\$889,878	\$949,750	\$848,838
Fees and other income	\$493,242	\$244,522	\$138,662	\$100,113
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$1,433,464	\$1,229,716	\$1,193,449	\$989,775
Salary and consultancy costs	\$611,806	\$882,795	\$691,321	\$676,578
Allocation of redundancy provisions	\$0	\$0	\$0	-\$403,478
Programme services	\$478,257	\$358,119	\$365,851	\$201,568
Support services / indirect costs	\$343,401	\$388,801	\$177,377	\$117,100
<b>Balance</b>	-\$52,590	-\$85,316	-\$205,031	-\$222,177
<b>Fund balance at end/beginning of year</b>	-\$45,499	\$21,138	-\$75,148	-\$262,448
<b>Exchange variation</b>	\$14,074	-\$868	\$17,740	\$3,893
<b>Fund balance at end of year</b>	\$21,138	-\$75,148	-\$262,448	-\$238,388

1. Salary costs comprise salaries, benefits, social contributions, costs of termination
2. Programme services includes Secretariat travel (including travel associated with Committee meetings), council meetings, seminars and conferences, direct support to Committees
3. Support services / indirect costs includes telephone / fax, office equipment, printing, insurance, etc.

### **Presentation of candidates for 2002-5 Council**

The names of candidates for Council and officers were presented. These were as follows: For Honorary President, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho (Brazil); for Vice President, Paulina Makinwa-Adebusoye (Nigeria), Douglas Massey (United States), Noriko Tsuya (Japan), and Hania Zlotnik (Mexico); for Secretary General, Mary Kritz (United States) and Alphonse MacDonald (Suriname); for Council, Alaka Basu (India), Graziella Caselli (Italy), David Coleman (United Kingdom), Maria Coleta De Oliveira (Brazil), Nico Keilman (Netherlands), Ts'ui-jung Liu (China), Cheikh Mbacke (Senegal), Peter McDonald (Australia), Carla Makhlof Obermeyer (Lebanon), Olatunji Orubuloye (Nigeria), Edith Pantelides (Argentina), Anne Pebley (United States), Hoda Rashad (Egypt), Luis Rosero-Bixby (Costa Rica), Zeba Sathar (Pakistan), Vladimir Shkolnikov (Russia), Alan Simmons (Canada), James Trussell (United States), and Zeng Yi (China).

### **Presentation of the new Committee on Nominations**

Results of the election of the Committee on Nominations were reported. The new committee members are: Susan Watkins (United States), Gavin Jones (Australia), José Alberto de Carvalho (Brazil), Jacques Véron (France), Antonio Golini (Italy), Yaw Ofosu (Ghana), and Julieta Quilodrán (Mexico).

### **Discussion**

The floor was opened for comments and discussion.

**John Hobcraft** congratulated the Union on its successful move of the Secretariat from Liège to Paris, commenting that it was scarcely conceivable that the Salvador conference could have been successfully arranged in the same year that the move took place. He objected, however, to the way in which the journal *Population Studies* had been removed from the list of free publications sent to members of the Union. This step, taken without sufficient consultation with the editors of the journal, had abruptly reduced the *Population Studies* subscription list while simultaneously depriving many Third World researchers of a valuable asset. Mr. Hobcraft also commented that the IUSSP Science Policy Statement issued the year before was a con-



fusing document. Such statements need to be carefully worded, scientifically sound and not rushed out without consultation with the members of the Union. If the Union plans to head in the direction of issuing such statements, there must be an open debate involving the membership. He expressed concern over the activities of the Science Panel on Population and the Environment. Would the statement produced by the panel be an official IUSSP statement? Would the publication bear the IUSSP logo? How were funds for this activity, which were raised using the IUSSP's name, to be shared between the Union and other organisations involved?

**Richard Leete** suggested that Council should be entrusted with the task of developing guidelines on the use of the IUSSP logo.

**James Ntozi** expressed disappointment that the election of the following Council was not going to be held on the spot at Bahia. This might have the effect of reducing the number of Third World voters. The Union appeared to be emphasising the internet increasingly, but internet access is difficult and expensive for members in low-income countries. Mr. Ntozi noted that few African members had been able to attend the Conference and asked how travel resources had been allocated. He also wondered whether a regional distribution of membership was available. Finally, he asked that the French financial contribution to the Union be clarified.

**Allan Hill** complimented the outgoing Council and officers for improving access to information, especially through the internet. He added that there must be other ways, in addition to the Union's traditional committees and working groups, to publicise the Union's scientific results. He expressed regret about the decision to discontinue the Union's circulation of key journals since in many poor countries, internet access remains difficult and costly. Many members could not see the draw of Union membership without the access to the new scientific literature membership formerly provided.

**Jack Caldwell** seconded the opinion that the move to Paris had been successfully handled. However, he expressed reservations about the editorial in the last IUSSP Bulletin, which appeared to give insufficient credit to former Union staff for the successful implementation of the move and the staging of the Conference. He cautioned against premature congratulations about cost savings gained from the move, arguing that as the job tenure of new staff grew, so would their costs. Finally, he offered a comment on the IUSSP-Oxford University Press book series - while there was long-standing dissatisfac-

tion over delays, most of these delays were the Union's fault, not OUP's. He stressed a need for strict rules.

**Wolfgang Lutz**, in response to a number of comments made, stipulated that the French contribution to the Union for 2001 consisted of 2 million francs (of which 1 million represented a special grant for the Conference and costs of moving) plus free office space at INED. Regarding the removal of Population Studies from the list of journals sent to members free, he cited poor communications and confusion attendant on the move from Liège to Paris for the lack of advance warning. The free Population Studies subscription, he reiterated, was a major cost to the Union. The regional distribution of members would be available on the IUSSP website. On-site voting at the Conference was not possible under the Statutes, which call for a postal ballot. While some residents of low-income countries lack access to the Internet, an informal survey suggested that most of the 20 percent of Union members without internet access were not residents of low income countries, but rather aged members in developed countries who simply chose not to use the Web.

**Landis MacKellar** addressed the issue of how funds for Conference attendance had been distributed. First priority was given to session organisers, paper authors, and discussants who could not obtain funding elsewhere. Remaining funds were allocated to poster authors, with priority given to nationals of low-income countries residing in low-income countries whose home institutions were able to offer partial financing. The small amount left over was allocated on an ad hoc basis to participants from countries that would not otherwise be represented at the Conference, including many African participants.

**Brígida García** asked whether the Union is planning to continue gender activities and inquired about the status of the Exploratory Mission on Gender. **Wolfgang Lutz** replied that Council is waiting for the report of the Exploratory Mission and **Thérèse Locoh**, co-chair of the Commission reported that the report would be finalised soon.

**Monica Das Gupta** requested that, in addition to placing announcements for seminars, etc., on the web, members be informed via e-mail. Wolfgang Lutz replied that perhaps a "News" e-mail might be sent to members every two months or so.

**James Trussell**, on behalf of Council, recognized the contribution of Wolfgang Lutz to the IUSSP and presented him with a token

of appreciation for his tireless work during his four years in office.

**José Alberto Magno de Carvalho** thanked the National Organising Committee for its enormous effort in organising the conference on behalf of the Union. However, he noted that, while it is generally expected that the NOC organise a one-day seminar on the demography of the host country, virtually no non-Brazilians had attended the excellent seminar on Brazilian demography. In closing, he thanked members of the outgoing Council for their hard work and cooperation and promised continued support to the new Council.

### **Location of 2005 General Population Conference**

**Catherine Rollet**, representing the French National Committee for the IUSSP, took the floor and announced an official offer from the Government of France to host the 2005 General Conference.

The second meeting of the General Assembly ended at 20:00. The meeting participants met during the Plenary Session to listen to the incoming President Jacques Vallin's closing address.

## ***Assemblée Générale de l'UIESP*** ***Salvador (Brésil), 20 et 22 août 2001***

### *Première réunion*

*Le 20 août 2001 à 12.50 h, la première séance de l'Assemblée Générale de l'UIESP fut déclarée ouverte par José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, Président de l'UIESP, qui, dans son mot de bienvenue, s'inspira de son discours d'ouverture du Congrès. L'Assemblée procéda d'abord à l'adoption de l'ordre du jour. L'objectif de cette première réunion de l'Assemblée Générale était de communiquer aux membres les noms des personnes que le Conseil proposait pour constituer le prochain Comité des Nominations, et de les informer de la possibilité d'ajouter d'autres noms. Le Conseil présenta les noms suivants : José Alberto Magno de Carvalho (Brésil), Susan Watkins (USA), Julieta Quilodrán (Mexique), Kannan Navaneetham (Inde), Sergei Scherbov (Russie), Sri Moertiningsih Adioetomo (Indonésie), Yaw Ofosu (Ghana), et Antonio Golini (Italie). Les conditions de soumission des candidatures supplémentaires et les procédures de vote furent expliquées en détail.*

*La première séance de l'Assemblée Générale de l'UIESP fut levée à 13.15 h.*

### **Deuxième réunion**

*Le 22 août 2001 à 18.30 h, la deuxième séance de l'Assemblée Générale de l'UIESP fut ouverte par José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, Président de l'UIESP. Le Rapport d'Activité présenté par Wolfgang Lutz, Secrétaire Général et Trésorier, était le premier point à l'ordre du jour.*

### **Discours du Secrétaire Général et Trésorier, Wolfgang Lutz**

*Lors de la première réunion du nouveau Conseil, en février 1998 à Liège, l'état de l'Union a fait l'objet d'une discussion assez fondamentale. Plusieurs traditions qui avaient cours depuis longtemps dans l'Union ont été remises en question et la nécessité de préparer l'Union pour le 21<sup>e</sup> siècle a été le sujet dominant. Le premier but a été de discuter efficacement des objectifs principaux de l'Union tels qu'ils sont inscrits à l'Article 1 de nos Statuts : "...ayant pour objectif de faire progresser la science démographique. À cet effet, l'Union doit favoriser les contacts entre les démographes du monde entier et susciter l'intérêt des gouvernements, des organisations nationales et internationales, des institutions scientifiques et du public en général pour la démographie." La plupart des nouvelles initiatives prises depuis trois ans et demi concernent ces objectifs prioritaires de l'Union inscrits dans ses Statuts.*

### **1. L'entrée dans l'âge électronique**

*Il est encourageant de constater que [www.iussp.org](http://www.iussp.org) est devenu une combinaison de lettres très utilisée par la plupart des membres de l'Union. Le site web est fonctionnel depuis le milieu de l'année 1998 et s'est rapidement affirmé comme le moyen de communication principal entre le siège et les membres en matière de comités scientifiques, groupes de travail et autres activités de l'Union, y compris ce Congrès général. Le site est amélioré en permanence et nous espérons qu'il sera encore plus utilisé à l'avenir. Pour l'instant, la partie réservée aux membres (répertoire des membres en ligne, etc.) ne semble pas encore utilisée dans toutes ses possibilités. Pour vous souvenir du mot de passe (l'année de création de l'Union), nous distribuons gratuitement un tapis de souris UIESP à tous les membres.*

*Cette forme de communication quasi instantanée avec toutes les parties du monde semble être un outil tout à fait approprié pour atteindre notre objectif statutaire de "...favoriser les contacts entre les démographes du monde entier." Au début, nous avons craint que certains de nos membres des pays en voie de développement n'aient pas accès à cet outil et soient donc*

*privés d'informations importantes concernant l'Union. Nous avons même constitué une réserve de fonds pour aider des membres à se connecter au web. Mais cela s'est avéré superflu car l'accès au web s'est très rapidement amélioré dans les pays en voie de développement, notamment pour les membres liés à des instituts de recherche. En effet, la plupart des quelques membres encore dépourvus d'accès au courrier électronique et à l'internet se trouvent dans les pays riches et ne souhaitent pas utiliser cette technologie par choix personnel. Et, comme vous l'avez constaté, nous continuons à envoyer des copies papier du Bulletin et d'autres informations importantes.*

*Nous sommes également en train d'examiner la possibilité de compléter, voire même de remplacer en partie, le mode de fonctionnement actuel de nos comités scientifiques et groupes de travail par la communication électronique. Avec le soutien financier de la Fondation MacArthur et le soutien institutionnel du CIESIN, nous avons mis au point un réseau électronique de recherche sur le thème "population et environnement", domaine qui semble particulièrement hétérogène et qui devrait pouvoir bénéficier des apports les plus diversifiés possibles (voir : [www.populationenvironmentresearch.org](http://www.populationenvironmentresearch.org)). Une telle approche semble avoir le grand avantage d'être très ouverte et de donner à tous les membres concernés, et même aux autres scientifiques, la possibilité de participer aux activités scientifiques de ce réseau, répondant ainsi à une vieille critique selon laquelle les Comités de l'Union sont trop restreints et n'impliquent pas tous les membres concernés. D'un autre côté, il s'avère difficile de communiquer valablement avec des personnes que l'on n'a jamais vues. En effet, notre expérience des cyber-séminaires a montré que le degré d'implication personnelle dans un séminaire sur Internet est bien inférieur à celui d'une personne qui se déplace pour rejoindre pendant quelques jours un groupe de collègues. Cette question doit donc encore être examinée et testée pour que le prochain Conseil puisse en tirer des conclusions quant au futur mode de fonctionnement de nos comités scientifiques et groupes de travail.*

## **2. Les réseaux régionaux**

*Une autre méthode pour améliorer la communication entre démographes de différents pays serait de favoriser les réseaux régionaux de population ou d'en mettre en place de nouveaux. En effet, il est souvent plus facile et plus fructueux d'avoir un échange d'opinions avec des collègues de pays voisins que d'accéder directement au niveau mondial. Des associations régionales pour l'étude scientifique de la population existent dans beaucoup de régions du monde. Cependant, on n'en trouve encore aucune en Asie. C'est pourquoi*

*l'Union a décidé de créer l'Asian Population Network (APN) en collaboration avec l'"Asian MetaCentre for Population and Sustainable Development Analysis", qui est financé par le Wellcome Trust (voir le site [www.populationasia.org](http://www.populationasia.org)). L'Asian Population Network organise, parfois avec les comités de l'UIESP, 2 à 3 séminaires sur des questions de fond, dont les participants viennent majoritairement des pays d'Asie. L'un des résultats de cette initiative a été la préparation du premier congrès régional de l'UIESP en Asie avec un comité international d'organisation dirigé par notre ancienne présidente Mercedes Concepcion. Ce congrès aura lieu en juin 2002 à Bangkok.*

*Mentionnons encore que l'Union a participé à la Conférence Africaine sur la Population (Durban, décembre 1999) et à la Conférence Européenne sur la Population (Helsinki, juin 2001). Nous avons également organisé des sessions d'information et des stands à plusieurs congrès de la Population Association of America.*

### **3. Étudiants associés et restructuration des cotisations**

*Sur proposition de nos membres, le Conseil a décidé de créer la catégorie particulière des "Étudiants associés de l'UIESP". Pour obtenir ce statut, il n'est pas nécessaire d'être élu, comme c'est le cas pour les membres ordinaires ; ces étudiants associés n'ont pas les privilèges statutaires des membres élus, mais ils sont impliqués dans le réseau scientifique de l'UIESP. L'espoir est qu'après avoir terminé leurs études, ils deviendront des membres à part entière. Ce processus est déjà enclenché.*

*Nous avons également décidé de restructurer les cotisations de manière que la cotisation de base n'inclue plus que les revues fournies gratuitement aux membres de l'Union. Cela a malheureusement entraîné l'interruption de l'envoi automatique de "Population Studies" à tous les membres, à cause de la lourde charge financière que cela représentait. Mais, pour "Population Studies" et pour plusieurs autres revues de qualité dans notre domaine, nous avons négocié des tarifs réduits d'abonnement en faveur des membres de l'Union.*

*Le décompte le plus récent (12 août 2001) des membres et étudiants associés en règle de cotisation atteint le chiffre de 1906 personnes, soit l'effectif le plus élevé jamais enregistré. Voici la pyramide des âges actuelle des membres de l'Union et les pyramides futures selon divers scénarios d'évolution. Le message peut-être le plus important qui en émane est que l'Union, comme le monde qui nous entoure, vieillit. Il est donc essentiel de poursuivre nos efforts pour attirer vers l'Union les meilleurs jeunes chercheurs.*

Figure 1. Membre de l'Union en 2001







Figure 2. Membres de l'Union en 2021 selon l'hypothèse de croissance forte (entrées annuelles : 90 hommes et 90 femmes – sorties annuelles :



**Figure 3. Membres de l'Union en 2021 selon l'hypothèse de croissance modérée (entrées annuelles : 60 hommes et 30 femmes - sorties)**



**Figure 4. Membres de l'Union en 2021 selon l'hypothèse de croissance faible (entrées annuelles : 30 hommes et 15 femmes - sorties annuelles :**





#### **4. Publications**

*Les délais excessifs de publication de nos livres chez Oxford University Press (OUP) et le fait qu'une grande partie des membres ne voient jamais ces livres à cause de leur prix élevé, ont amené le Conseil à envisager la création d'une revue de l'Union. C'est un problème délicat car cela impliquerait d'entrer en concurrence directe avec les revues existantes dans notre domaine. Après mûre réflexion, ce projet a été ajourné et on a donné la priorité à la conclusion d'un accord avec OUP qui garantisse des délais plus courts et l'accès des membres aux réimpressions des communications les plus importantes. Les négociations avec OUP sont actuellement en cours.*

#### **5. Communication entre le monde scientifique et le monde politique**

*L'information des gouvernements et des organisations nationales et internationales sur les questions démographiques constitue un autre objectif de l'Union inscrit dans ses Statuts. Traditionnellement, l'interaction entre les mondes politique et scientifique au niveau international culminait lors des Conférences Mondiales sur la Population, qui ont lieu une fois tous les 10 ans. Cependant, elle a diminué d'intensité avec le temps. En particulier, dans le cadre de la Conférence de 1994, au Caire, des frustrations se sont exprimées quant à l'insuffisance de cette interaction, et le président de la dernière Assemblée Générale, à Beijing en 1997, s'en est fait l'écho. Le nouveau Conseil a repris cette question et a publié en 1999 une déclaration sur la relation entre science et politique à l'occasion des manifestations du "Caire + 5". Dans cette déclaration, le Conseil souligne la nécessité de tenir compte non seulement des droits et du bien-être de l'individu, mais aussi des implications des tendances démographiques au niveau sociétal. Le Conseil annonce également des efforts supplémentaires pour résumer et communiquer à tous les membres et au public les résultats des travaux des comités scientifiques et groupes de travail de l'UIESP, et pour lancer une série de discussions sur des thèmes scientifiques "chauds" et controversés.*

*Tout récemment, l'UIESP a mis en place un "Panel scientifique mondial sur la population et l'environnement" (qui s'inspire largement du modèle de panel scientifique US-NAS) en coopération avec l'IIASA et l'Université des Nations Unies, grâce à des fonds du gouvernement autrichien, du FNUAP, de l'ONU, de l'IIASA et de la Fondation MacArthur. Nafis Sadik et Maurice Strong (président du Sommet de la Terre de Rio en 1992) parrainent ce panel, et Wolfgang Lutz et Mahendra Shah en sont les coordinateurs. Le Panel s'est récemment réuni pour la première fois au NIDI (Pays-Bas). Son objectif principal est la production de connaissances scientifiques sur le rôle de la variable démographique dans le développement*

*durable. Ces résultats devront alimenter, au niveau politique le plus élevé, le Sommet mondial sur le développement durable, à Johannesburg en 2002. Comme cette conférence des Nations Unies n'est pas un simple "Rio + 10", mais aborde une vision plus large du développement durable, et puisqu'il n'y aura probablement pas de grande Conférence "Le Caire + 10" en 2004, le sommet de Johannesburg semble être le lieu idéal pour examiner les implications sociétales de la dynamique de la population sur le développement et l'environnement. L'une des tâches primordiales dans ce contexte sera de s'assurer que le chemin de Rio à Johannesburg passe par Le Caire et que le consensus du Caire ait sa place à l'ordre du jour de Johannesburg. Un projet de déclaration sera largement discuté cet automne dans un cyber-séminaire (réalisé par le réseau de recherche sur la population et l'environnement déjà cité) et il sera publié au printemps. Cette déclaration sera celle des membres du panel s'exprimant à titre personnel, et non celle des institutions intervenantes.*

*Pour les résumés des résultats des recherches de l'UIESP et leur diffusion, nous sommes actuellement au début d'un long processus. Un volume résumant le travail de l'UIESP dans le domaine du genre pendant ces dix dernières années a déjà été élaboré et largement diffusé. D'autres domaines de recherche devraient suivre. L'affichage permanent des activités scientifiques de l'UIESP dans le grand hall de ce Centre de Congrès est un autre pas dans la même direction. Enfin, pendant ce Congrès, les sessions plénières de chaque après-midi visent à instaurer des discussions publiques sur des questions controversées sur le plan scientifique.*

## **6. Déménagement du siège de l'Union**

*Pour atteindre les objectifs fixés dans ses Statuts, l'UIESP doit disposer d'une base financière solide et durable et d'un siège performant. Lors d'un examen de l'état des affaires de l'Union au début de 1998, le Conseil a constaté qu'à long terme, notre bilan recettes attendues/dépenses fixes était préoccupant. Cette situation était liée à la question de l'implantation du siège, du fait que le gouvernement belge avait cessé d'aider financièrement l'Union. Suite à ce constat, le Conseil a décidé, en février 1998, d'inviter d'autres pays à présenter des offres de soutien financier en échange du déménagement du siège de l'Union. L'espoir était alors que cette démarche mettrait le gouvernement belge sous pression et qu'il dégagerait des fonds rendant le déménagement inutile. À la réunion suivante du Conseil, en décembre 1998, on disposait de deux propositions concrètes, l'une du gouvernement autrichien et l'autre du gouvernement français. Le gouvernement belge n'avait pas répondu à l'invitation de rétablir son aide*

*financière. Le Conseil a alors décidé de nommer un groupe de trois membres éminents de l'Union (Jane Menken, Massimo Livi-Bacci et Guillaume Wunsch) pour examiner les trois alternatives (l'INED, l'IIASA ou le maintien à Liège sans financement belge). Leur rapport conclut que "...tout en craignant les conséquences à court terme, nous pensons qu'il est à long terme dans l'intérêt de l'Union de déménager à Paris". Lors de la réunion du Conseil à Liège en novembre 1999, il a été décidé que l'intérêt à long terme devait primer sur les problèmes à court terme et que le siège serait transféré à Paris, sauf proposition de subvention du gouvernement belge avant avril 2000. En dépit des efforts de dernière minute de membres belges de l'UIESP, ce délai est passé sans résultat et il a été décidé de déménager les bureaux du siège à Paris vers le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 2001.*

*Aucun des membres du personnel ne souhaitant déménager à Paris, ce transfert du siège impliquait malheureusement que l'Union se sépare de la plupart de son personnel expérimenté (seul Pierre Alderson a continué à travailler pour nous à la coordination du Congrès de 2001). En mai 2000, nous avons été informés par notre Secrétaire Exécutive, Jane Verrall, que, pour des raisons personnelles, elle préférerait retourner en Angleterre plutôt que d'aller à Paris et former une nouvelle équipe, comme cela avait été prévu. Nous avons réussi à élaborer, de commun accord avec chaque membre du personnel, un plan de licenciement (ou, pour certains, de départ en préretraite) et de compensations financières. Cela a entraîné un dégraissage significatif du personnel du siège pendant la deuxième moitié de l'année, qui a indubitablement causé quelques perturbations dans les services rendus aux membres et aux comités. Je présente mes excuses pour les désagréments que ces changements ont pu causer. Cependant, je suis heureux de pouvoir annoncer qu'une nouvelle équipe, nettement plus petite, a repris le contrôle des choses pendant ces derniers mois, sous la conduite dynamique de Landis MacKellar. Ils ont réussi à élaborer un nouveau mode de fonctionnement, malgré l'énorme pression que représentait la préparation parallèle de ce Congrès. Le moment choisi pour le déménagement, il faut l'admettre, n'était pas idéal, mais le processus a produit sa propre dynamique et nous regardons l'avenir avec confiance.*

*Au nom du Conseil, j'aimerais exprimer nos remerciements et notre très grande estime aux anciens membres du personnel de Liège, pour leur fidélité et leur dévouement à l'Union pendant toutes ces années. Applaudissons-les !*

*J'aimerais souhaiter la bienvenue aux nouveaux membres du personnel à Paris : Landis MacKellar (USA), Elizabeth Omoluabi (Nigeria), Catrin Jones (Pays de Galles) et Delphine Lebugle (France). J'aimerais les*

*remercier, eux et Pierre Alderson, pour l'organisation sans faille de ce Congrès et leur souhaiter bonne chance pour l'avenir. Nous traversons un moment de changement et de réorientation, et toutes les propositions des membres pour un nouveau mode de fonctionnement plus efficace sont les bienvenues. Adressez-nous vos suggestions éventuelles, s'il vous plaît.*

*Comme le motif du déménagement était en premier lieu financier, il est intéressant de résumer notre position dans ce domaine après le déménagement. L'Union prévoit un excédent significatif pour l'année 2001, même sans prendre en compte la vente de la maison de Liège (cet argent sera mis sur un compte de réserve). Avec l'excédent enregistré l'année dernière (dû en grande partie à l'utilisation des provisions pour licenciement liées au départ du personnel), cela devrait suffire pour sortir le bilan cumulé de la zone rouge pour la première fois depuis 1997. Il convient de noter que nos frais fixes annuels (constitués principalement par les salaires) sont maintenant ramenés à moins du tiers de ce qu'ils étaient à Liège. L'argent ainsi économisé sera investi dans les activités scientifiques de l'Union. Déjà, nous avons été en mesure de prendre en charge les frais de voyage à Salvador de plus de 130 collègues (principalement en provenance des pays en voie de développement), en plus de l'appui fourni par nos hôtes brésiliens.*

### ***Brefs comptes-rendus des activités des Comités, Groupes de Travail, Réseaux de Recherche et autres***

*L'une des innovations de l'Assemblée Générale de cette année est que les rapports des groupes de recherche de l'UIESP ont été communiqués sous forme d'affiches plutôt que par des comptes-rendus lus devant l'Assemblée Générale. Les membres ont été invités à passer un peu de temps dans la zone d'affichage réservée à l'UIESP. Les informations les plus récentes sur les activités des Comités et des Groupes de Travail sont disponibles sur le site internet de l'UIESP.*

## **Présentation des comptes de l'Union et désignation des commissaires aux comptes**

Entrées et dépenses, 1997-2000 (sur la base des comptes audités)

	1997	1998	1999	2000
<b>Revenues</b>				
Subventions	\$1 490 025	\$1 134 399	\$998 418	\$909 948
Cotisations et autres	\$1 003 563	\$668 970	\$848 756	\$849 838
Doit inscriptions pour Babia	\$482 462	\$264 421	\$138 692	\$160 113
Plus-value vente du bâtiment				
<b>Dépenses</b>				
Dépenses pour salaires et honoraires	\$1 433 464	\$1 226 714	\$1 193 449	\$996 778
moins utilisation des provisions de fonctionnement	\$911 606	\$602 795	\$651 321	\$978 578
Services programmes	\$0	\$0	\$0	-\$433 478
doit participation aux frais pour Babia	\$478 257	\$356 110	\$365 051	\$301 568
Comités, groupes de travail, réseaux				
Fonctionnement / frais indirects	\$343 601	\$266 939	\$177 077	\$117 102
<b>Bilan</b>				
Saldo au début d'exercice	\$52 581	-\$96 315	-\$205 031	\$222 178
Moins des échanges	-\$45 488	\$21 137	-\$75 146	-\$262 437
Saldo au fin d'exercice	\$14 074	-\$998	\$17 740	\$9 893
Saldo au fin d'exercice	\$21 137	-\$75 146	-\$262 437	-\$30 365

1. Les dépenses pour salaires comprennent les salaires, les avantages, les cotisations sociales et les primes de licenciement.
2. Les dépenses pour salaires se réfèrent uniquement au secrétariat, les frais pour l'assistance au FEPRU et au Congrès de la population en Aide sont inclus sous le titre services programmes.
3. Les services programmes comprennent le voyage du secrétariat ainsi que les déplacements associés aux réunions du Conseil, les réunions du Conseil, les séminaires et conférences et le soutien direct aux Comités.
4. Fonctionnement / frais indirects comprennent le téléphone / fax, l'équipement du bureau, l'impression, l'assurance, etc.

*Le rapport sur les comptes de l'Union pour 1997, 1998, 1999 et 2000, élaboré par les commissaires aux comptes Ernst and Young, a été présenté. Le tableau ci-dessus en donne un bref résumé chiffré. Les comptes apurés peuvent être demandés au Secrétariat de l'UIESP à Paris. Le maintien d'Ernst and Young comme commissaires aux comptes pour les quatre prochaines années a été décidé sans débat.*

### **Présentation des candidats au Conseil de 2002-5**

*Les noms des candidats au Conseil et au Bureau ont été présentés. Il s'agit des personnes suivantes : pour le poste de Président honoraire, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho (Brésil); pour le poste de Vice-Président, Paulina Makinwa-Adebusoye (Nigeria), Douglas Massey (États-Unis), Noriko Tsuya (Japon), et Hania Zlotnik (Mexique); pour le poste de Secrétaire Général et Trésorier, Mary Kritz (États-Unis) et Alphonse MacDonald (Suriname); et comme membres du Conseil, Alaka Basu (Inde), Graziella Caselli (Italie), David Coleman (Royaume-Uni), Maria Coleta De Oliveira (Brésil), Nico Keilman (Pays-Bas), Ts'ui-jung Liu (Chine), Cheikh Mbacke (Sénégal),*

*Peter McDonald (Australie), Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer (Liban), Olatunji Orubuloye (Nigeria), Edith Pantelides (Argentine), Anne Pebley (États-Unis), Hoda Rashad (Égypte), Luis Rosero-Bixby (Costa Rica), Zeba Sathar (Pakistan), Vladimir Shkolnikov (Russie), Alan Simmons (Canada), James Trussell (États-Unis), et Zeng Yi (Chine).*

### **Présentation du nouveau Comité des Nominations**

*Les résultats de l'élection au Comité des Nominations ont été présentés. Les nouveaux membres du Comité sont : Susan Watkins (États-Unis), Gavin Jones (Australie), José Alberto de Carvalho (Brésil), Jacques Véron (France), Antonio Golini (Italie), Yaw Ofosu (Ghana), et Julieta Quilodrán (Mexique).*

### **Débats**

*La parole a été donnée aux participants.*

**John Hobcraft** félicite l'Union pour le déménagement réussi du Secrétariat de Liège à Paris et ajoute qu'il est à peine concevable que le Congrès de Salvador ait été si bien préparé la même année que le déménagement. Cependant, il critique la manière dont la revue "Population Studies" a été retirée de la liste des publications envoyées gratuitement aux membres de l'Union. Ce changement, intervenu sans consultation suffisante des éditeurs de la revue, a brusquement réduit le nombre des abonnés à "Population Studies" et a privé beaucoup de chercheurs du Tiers Monde d'un instrument précieux. J. Hobcraft estime également que la déclaration sur la science et la politique publiée l'année dernière par l'UIESP est un document confus. De telles déclarations doivent être rédigées avec soin, irréprochables du point de vue scientifique, et ne doivent pas être diffusées précipitamment sans consulter les membres de l'Union. Si l'Union envisage de s'orienter vers la production de documents de ce genre, il faut un débat ouvert parmi les membres. J. Hobcraft exprime sa préoccupation à propos des activités du panel scientifique sur la population et l'environnement. Le document élaboré par le panel sera-t-il un texte officiel de l'UIESP ? La publication portera-t-elle le logo de l'UIESP ? Comment les fonds recueillis pour cette activité en utilisant le nom de l'UIESP seront-ils partagés entre l'Union et les autres organisations impliquées ?

**Richard Leete** suggère de confier au Conseil la tâche de mettre au point des lignes directrices pour l'utilisation du logo de l'UIESP.

**James Ntozi** exprime sa déception que l'élection du prochain Conseil n'ait pas lieu tout de suite à Bahia. Reporter le vote pourrait avoir pour

*conséquence la réduction du nombre de votants du Tiers Monde. L'Union semble mettre de plus en plus l'accent sur internet, mais l'accès à internet est difficile et cher pour les membres des pays à bas revenu. J. Ntozi remarque que peu de membres africains ont pu assister au Congrès et demande comment ont été allouées les subventions de voyage. Il se demande également si une répartition régionale des membres est disponible. Enfin, il demande des détails sur la contribution financière de la France à l'Union.*

**Allan Hill** félicite le Conseil et les membres du bureau sortants pour l'amélioration de l'accès à l'information, notamment par l'utilisation d'internet. Il ajoute qu'il doit y avoir d'autres moyens que les traditionnels Comités et Groupes de Travail pour faire connaître les travaux scientifiques de l'Union. Il regrette la décision d'interrompre la diffusion par l'Union de revues clé car, dans beaucoup de pays pauvres, l'accès à internet reste difficile et cher. Beaucoup de membres pourraient ne pas voir l'intérêt d'appartenir à l'Union si l'accès à la littérature scientifique récente, procuré auparavant par l'Union, n'est plus assuré.

**Jack Caldwell** est aussi d'avis que le déménagement à Paris a été un succès. Il exprime cependant des réserves sur l'éditorial du dernier Bulletin de l'UIESP, qui lui semble ne pas reconnaître à leur juste valeur les mérites des anciens membres du personnel de l'Union dans la bonne organisation du déménagement et du Congrès. Il recommande qu'on ne se félicite pas trop vite pour les économies procurées par le déménagement, arguant que si le nouveau personnel se stabilise dans son emploi, son coût va augmenter. Finalement, au sujet de la collection d'ouvrages UIESP-Oxford University Press, il estime que, s'il y a depuis longtemps un mécontentement à propos des délais de publication, la plupart de ces retards sont imputables à l'Union, non à OUP. Il insiste sur la nécessité de se donner des règles strictes.

En réponse à un certain nombre de commentaires, **Wolfgang Lutz** précise que la contribution française au budget de l'Union était en 2001 de 2 millions de francs (dont 1 million de subventions spéciales pour le Congrès et le déménagement) plus l'occupation gratuite de bureaux à l'INED. En ce qui concerne le retrait de "Population Studies" de la liste des revues envoyées gratuitement aux membres, il attribue à des difficultés de communication et à la confusion du déménagement de Liège à Paris le fait qu'il n'ait pas été annoncé suffisamment tôt. Il répète que l'abonnement gratuit à "Population Studies" était une lourde charge financière pour l'Union. Quant à la répartition régionale des membres, elle est disponible sur le site web de l'UIESP. Les Statuts, qui prévoient le vote par correspondance, ne permettent pas de voter sur place au Congrès. Si certains habitants des pays pauvres n'ont pas accès à internet, les résultats d'une enquête informelle ont montré

*que la plupart des 20 % des membres de l'Union qui n'ont pas accès à internet ne résident pas dans ces pays, mais qu'il s'agit plutôt de membres âgés des pays développés qui ont simplement choisi de ne pas utiliser le web.*

**Landis MacKellar** aborde le sujet de la répartition des fonds destinés à faciliter la participation au Congrès. La priorité a été donnée aux organisateurs de sessions, aux auteurs de communications et aux commentateurs qui n'ont pas pu obtenir de fonds ailleurs. Les fonds restants ont été alloués aux auteurs d'affiches, avec une priorité pour les ressortissants de pays pauvres résidant dans un pays pauvre et à qui leurs institutions locales étaient en mesure d'offrir un financement partiel. Un petit reliquat a été distribué, au cas par cas, aux participants de pays qui autrement n'auraient pas été représentés au Congrès, y compris de nombreux Africains.

**Brígida García** demande si l'Union envisage de poursuivre les activités consacrées au genre et s'inquiète du statut de la Mission Exploratoire sur le Genre. **Wolfgang Lutz** répond que le Conseil attend le rapport de la Mission et **Thérèse Locoh**, co-présidente de la Commission, ajoute que le rapport sera bientôt terminé.

**Monica Das Gupta** demande qu'en plus de l'annonce des séminaires, etc., sur le web, les membres soient informés par e-mail. **Wolfgang Lutz** répond qu'un courrier électronique de "Nouvelles" pourrait être envoyé aux membres tous les deux mois environ.

**James Trussell**, au nom du Conseil, rend hommage au travail de Wolfgang Lutz à l'UIESP et lui offre un cadeau en reconnaissance pour son infatigable activité pendant ses quatre années d'exercice.

**José Alberto Magno de Carvalho** remercie le Comité National d'Organisation pour les énormes efforts consacrés à l'organisation du Congrès au nom de l'Union. Il remarque cependant que, bien qu'on attende généralement du Comité National d'Organisation qu'il tienne un séminaire d'un jour sur la démographie du pays hôte, pratiquement aucun non-Brésilien n'a participé à l'excellent séminaire consacré à la démographie du Brésil. Pour terminer, il remercie les membres du Conseil sortant pour leur dur travail et leur coopération, et il s'engage à soutenir de même le nouveau Conseil.

### **Lieu du Congrès Général 2005**


**Catherine Rollet** prend la parole au nom du Comité National Français de l'UIESP et annonce l'offre officielle du Gouvernement français d'accueillir le Congrès Général de 2005 en France.



## **New Members** ***Nouveaux membres***

During the year 2001, 168 new members joined the IUSSP. 116 of these were Full Members and 52 were Student Associates. Of these new members, 52% were male and 48% female.

*Au cours de l'année 2001, 168 nouveaux membres ont été accueillis au sein de l'UIESP, dont 116 membres ordinaires et 52 étudiants associés. Parmi ces nouveaux membres, 52 % sont des hommes et 48 % des femmes.*



## **Scientific Activities** ***Activités scientifiques***

### **Scientific Committee Reports** ***Rapports des Comités Scientifiques***

#### **Report on activities of the Scientific Committee on Longevity and Health**

The week organised by the IUSSP Committee on Longevity and Health at Peking University (22-27 October 2001) which started with a three-day seminar, an international symposium and a two-day training

was a big success.

The second IUSSP seminar on longevity and health will provide enough good papers to prepare a second book to be submitted to Oxford University Press.

The Symposium on Healthy Longevity Studies in China gathered between 100 and 150 fellows with the participation of the vice president of the Congress of People and two vice ministers. Jean-Marie Robine called for more collaborative work between the western teams and the Chinese teams and said that IUSSP will help these collaborative efforts with its means. Several papers, all original, will complement the seminar papers for the book.

The training was a huge success with 60 participants in total of which 45 followed the computer-in hand-sessions. A high-tech computer laboratory providing one computer per student and wonderful teaching facilities such as the projection of various screens on the wall were provided. This confirms that the IUSSP Committee on Longevity and Health was right proposing to attach an open symposium to the seminar in order to broaden IUSSP activities to more fellows and to attach a training in order to broaden IUSSP to young students and demographers.

One lesson from Beijing is that the offer of the IUSSP (symposium and/or training) has to be adapted to the local needs. In a developing country like China, this proposal was very suitable.

### **New York Meeting: in preparation**

Provisional date: October 2002; 3-day meeting, potential 1-day seminar co-sponsored by UN.

Provisional Title: Longevity extension: Prospects, Causes, and Consequences.

Participants: Demographers, Sociologists, Policy Scientists.

## **Working Group Reports**

### ***Rapports des Groupes de Travail***

#### **Report on activities of the Working Group on Urbanisation (WGU)**

Over the past year, the WGU has been involved in contributions to the General Population Conference in August 2001 and in preparations for its main activity, a workshop to be held in spring 2002.

At Salvador, the WGU organised two sessions, comprising four papers each and some 15 related poster displays. It also exhibited a poster outlining the Group's aims, planned activities and progress.

The first of the two sessions at Salvador, entitled 'The Challenge of New Forms of Urban Growth', raised questions about the ways in which urbanisation is currently monitored and analysed. A paper by Graeme Hugo, Tony Champion and Alfredo Lattes provided the context for this by rehearsing the primary issues that the WGU has decided to address. The urban-rural dichotomy was seen to be of even less value than 30 years ago when it was severely criticised by Sidney Goldstein's Committee on Urbanisation and Population Redistribution. A new conceptualisation of settlement is urgently needed by demographers.

The three other papers in this session examined aspects of the challenge and suggested possible ways forward. Gavin Jones highlighted the weakness of administrative boundaries in capturing current dimensions of urban growth in Southeast Asia and reviewed the possibilities for studying extended metropolitan regions there. Yu Zhu reviewed the record of urbanisation in China, according particular importance to the 'in situ' transformation of rural townships into towns in Fujian province. Rosana Baeninger described the 'new scenario' of migration and urban change in Sao Paulo State, Brazil, notably highlighting the spread of urbanisation and the growth of medium-sized cities.

The second Urbanisation session explored the dynamics of urban population change. Hania Zlotnik and Thomas Buettner revisited the UN's methodology for disaggregating urban population growth into its natural-change and net-migration/reclassification components, giving special attention to the derivation of urban-specific mortality and fertility estimates. Mark Montgomery explored the patterns and components of urban population change in the developing world, drawing on his research for the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Urban Population Dynamics. Ram Bhagat undertook a demographic reappraisal of urbanisation in India, highlighting the role of migration in the recent slowdown in India's rate of urbanisation and attributing this mainly to the economic policy launched in 1991. Finally, William Frey examined immigration's impact on urbanisation and internal migration in the USA, pointing to the polarisation of metropolitan areas between those gaining

strongly as a result of international migration and those growing mainly through domestic population movement.

As its main activity, the WGU has decided to organise a workshop focusing on the conceptualisation and measurement of human settlement in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. While WGU members are also interested in monitoring urbanisation trends and identifying distinctive patterns of mortality, fertility and migration across the settlement system, the WGU committee has been struck by the heavy reliance placed on traditional definitions of urban areas in presenting demographic data. In particular, international comparisons of urbanisation trends are being hampered by the continued use of the simple rural-urban dichotomy and by difficulties in achieving consistency in defining and classifying urban places.

The WGU was successful in obtaining the support of the Rockefeller Foundation for this workshop, which has therefore taken place at the Foundation's Study and Conference Centre at Bellagio, Italy, in spring 2000. Some 25 individuals have agreed to participate in this meeting by preparing papers on invited topics and/or acting as discussants. The overall aim is to try and work towards a new approach to studying urbanisation trends that takes account of the major changes currently taking place in the nature and architecture of human settlement systems around the world.

The workshop has been designed to address three fundamental questions. Firstly, given recent trends, are simple urban/rural classifications of population still adequate to capture the increasing complexity of the human settlement patterns? Assuming not, what are the types of human settlement which need to be differentiated in standard classifications of human settlement systems? Finally, how can these new concepts of human settlement systems be operationalised and used in standard data collection systems?

Bearing in mind these fundamental questions, the objectives set for the seminar are as follows:

- To conceptualise the basic dimensions of human settlement systems and establish whether or not it is now necessary to go beyond a simple urban-rural breakdown in standard population data collection systems.
- To test the idea that contemporary urban centres should no longer be defined only on the basis of the boundaries of their

built-up area but also in terms of the boundaries of the region they dominate.

- To investigate whether areas outside of cities need to be classified in meaningful ways (e.g. according to their degree of remoteness).
- To derive operational definitions of the new basic concepts of human settlements developed in the three tasks above.
- To investigate precisely how new technologies of data collection, storage, manipulation and analysis, especially spatial information systems (SIS), can assist in the operationalisation of these new concepts.

The meeting is arranged in three main parts. The first set of papers explore the challenge to be addressed in terms of current situation of definition and monitoring of urbanisation. The second set give detailed consideration of the conceptual and definitional issues: identifying the basic dimensions of human settlement that need to be taken into account in developing classifications and definitions; new approaches to urban/rural definition; and defining metropolitan areas and rural areas. Finally, the focus turns to more practical considerations, including: the significance of accessibility and remoteness in settlement classification; how to harness new information technology to assist in the development of new classifications of human settlements; and the information needs of planners and policy makers for population data on human settlement systems.

After the meeting, a core group will take responsibility for dissemination of the results, including academic publications and reports to supranational agencies and bodies representing census-taking, planning and other similar professional groups. The first priority is to report back the main findings to the IUSSP, including suggestions about the ways in which greater research activity in this area can be stimulated. In addition, a report presenting the main findings and recommendations will be prepared for circulation to relevant professional bodies. It is hoped that ultimately the United Nations and national statistical agencies will be involved in further discussions and assisted in introducing the new approach.

## **Meeting Reports**

### ***Rapports de réunions***

#### **Seminar on “Social Interaction in the Production and Circulation of Knowledge”**

Brown University, Providence, 20-25 March, 2001

This meeting was organised by the IUSSP Committee on Anthropological Demography in collaboration with Brown University.

This impetus for this workshop came from a series of questions about the design, implementation and evaluation of population based programmes and from a linked set of questions concerning the role of social processes in fertility change. Papers presented approached the social processes involved in the production and circulation of population knowledge from two directions. On the one hand, participants were interested in describing the flows of scientific and policy knowledge from global actors through national programmes to local consumers and the flow of local knowledge to global actors. At the same time, as anthropologists, the participants were interested in examining these flows in the context of recent theories of globalisation, culture and social interaction.

#### **Policy Questions**

Much of the scientific and policy knowledge deployed in population programmes — knowledge concerning the determinants of fertility and mortality transitions, the design of family planning programmes, AIDS, etc. — is formulated in global agencies. On the basis of this knowledge, recommendations regarding individual behaviour are formulated: e.g. couples will be better off with smaller families, condoms should be used in extramarital relations. Much effort and expense has been invested in disseminating these recommendations to men and women in developing countries. Yet the dissemination is not direct, from the producer of the knowledge and recommendations to the individuals for whom it is meant. Rather, the knowledge flows through various levels: first national governments and NGOs and then to local clinics before finally reaching the intended audience. The workshop raised three sets of questions about this process.

The first set of questions concerned the production of scientific and policy knowledge related to population and its formulation

in “best practice” and programme standards. Much of this work is carried out in or supported by agencies that have a global mandate such as the UN, the WHO and the World Bank and/or national agencies that have a global reach such as USAID. Some of this knowledge comes from natural scientists: e.g. the development of modern contraceptives and attempts to develop AIDS vaccines. Some comes from social scientists: e.g. efforts to measure the demand for family planning methods or condoms or to explain why women in a high fertility population use modern family planning in ways very different from those expected by the population movement. And some comes from policy debates such as the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development. It is clear that the choices made in the design and dissemination of such research — to concentrate on the development of female rather than male contraceptives, for example, or to implement family planning programmes that largely ignored males — have enormous consequences. In the past, too little attention has been given to the social process by which such choices are debated and ultimately made.

The second set of questions concerned what happens to the scientific and policy knowledge related to population programmes as it is disseminated first, to national governments and NGOs and then to local programmes and their clients. At the national level, it is evident that national governments and NGOs respond to suggestions concerning “best practice” and programme standards in a variety of ways. For example, although virtually all countries signed on to the Cairo Programme of Action, the depth of the commitment of some signatories can be questioned. Some have attempted to implement a wide variety of Cairo recommendations, whereas others have accepted a few recommendations but ignored others. Which recommendations have been accepted and which rejected, and why? If national governments and NGOs prefer to follow Cairo on STD/HIV prevention and on family planning but to ignore Cairo’s recommendations to curb domestic violence, why is this the case? What pressures are then brought to bear by donors to implement Cairo, and are these unevenly focused on some aspects of Cairo as well? In another area, why does the national AIDS programme in Kenya emphasize interventions aimed at prostitutes and truck-drivers, rather than ordinary husbands and wives in areas where seroprevalence rates among pregnant women are high? Similarly, at the local level, clinic staff nurses may adopt some of the Ministry of Health’s recom-

mentations but reject others. In general, how is scientific and policy knowledge winnowed and recast as it moves from the sites where it is produced to those where it is expected to be used? Are the changes, if any, a consequence of translation or are they also due to other social processes such as appropriation, collusion or resistance? Is resistance overt or is it simply a matter of failing to implement recommendations that are embarrassing or difficult to implement? How much power do national governments, NGOs, local programme staff and clients have in resisting the recommendations of donors? And on what grounds do they resist?

The third set of questions concerned the production of population knowledge in national and local sites and its circulation to global actors. Here work on the production and circulation of knowledge in translocal relations intersects work on social processes and fertility change in local settings. Against economic theories of fertility change that abstract representative individuals or couples from their social settings or that treat communities and nations as responding only to what takes place inside their borders, this work seeks to take account of the ways in which individuals and social groups are embedded in social systems. Persons and groups are tied together by “channels of social interaction” — local, national and global; horizontal as well as vertical — “through which information and ideas, evaluation, and social influence flow.” Learning is social as well as individual. Together these lines of research suggest questions such as the following. How is knowledge produced by members of local communities? How are global recommendations to be chaste or to always use condoms discussed by the men and women involved in transmitting HIV/AIDS? How can social scientists who come from the capital or abroad learn about these discussions? If national governments claim that there is no domestic violence in their country, or that the IUD is unacceptable to their people, do the global actors listen? Is there feedback that modifies the recommendations about “best practice” and programme standards?

### **Globalization, Culture, and Social Interaction**

The production and circulation of population knowledge are aspects of the production of global culture or globalization. Defined roughly as the movement, transmission, or serial reproduction of meaningful social forms — musical genres, consumer goods, financial instruments, scientific and policy knowledge, etc. — through



different sites in translocal structures, globalization has attracted considerable attention in recent years.

Modernization theorists of the 1960s and 1970s expected that eventually there would be a homogeneous global culture. This expectation was consistent with the more general concept of culture as a corpus of shared beliefs, usually closely confined to the boundaries of a particular territory or a particular group. In addition to enshrining a problematic distinction between knowledge and belief, this view fails to appreciate the extent to which new information is continually produced and circulated to groups far away, the variability in production and circulation across and between communities and the interactions through which social boundaries are defined, exercised and crossed. Currently, the notion of a trend toward a homogeneous global culture is being replaced by the idea that all culture, local as well as global, is an "organization of diversity." Reggae is popular in Malawi, Vaclav Havel admired Frank Zappa, and South African acapella groups are popular in the U.S. as the result of Paul Simon's work with Ladysmith Black Mambazo. Capital circles the globe in less than 24 hours. Depo-Provera is readily available in The Gambia. Coca Cola is everywhere. But we have to ask how these things are transformed as they move from one context to another.

All knowledge is produced in social interactions that are in some sense localized and all localities produce knowledge. In the contemporary world, the circulation of knowledge is rapid and pervasive. Some knowledge acquires a global character, moving from one locality to another or others through institutions with a global reach. The workshop asked how the global and the local are defined in relation to each other and what happens to knowledge as it circulates from local to global sites and back.

Workshop participants discussed the variety of relations through which "locality" is constituted relative to regional, state-level and international processes. As anthropologists, their approach necessarily proceeded from a theory of social action more complex than standard rational choice models, in which action is conceived in terms of autonomous individuals making choices in order to maximize their return. On the contrary, participants took the agents of fertility-related conduct to be individuals and groups co-engaged in various kinds of social interaction. This includes gossip and counselling and other face-to-face engagements among co-present agents.

It also includes soap operas and other mediated engagements among agents who are separated in time, space or other social dimensions. The relations through which “locality” is constituted are at once conduits through which information and ideas, evaluation, and social influence flow and critical sites at which agents learn and make choices.

If, for example, the village is pivotal for contraceptive choice in Thailand, might not the neighbourhood, the social network, church affiliation, the marketplace or the social movement be pivotal in another society or for another aspect of conduct involved in fertility or mortality? What, in short, are the key social units and factors that help define population-related decisions, strategies and habits? Not only can such factors have a critical impact on population, but they help define “locality.” They (or other similar ones) are among the elements to which local social agents orient when making decisions and engaging in actions. Sometimes this orientation is a matter of consciously focusing on social factors in making a decision or in acting. A woman, or a couple or a group (based on co-residence, kinship, network affiliation or other factors) decide on a course of action regarding, say, contraception, proper spacing of births or the treatment of childhood illness — attending explicitly to the expectations of their peers or to likely economic consequences. Often though, social factors are not explicitly thematized by actors in situ. Instead the social matrix is the taken-for-granted setting in which vital events are lived and evaluated.

In order to properly construct “locality” then, and the actional settings in which population consequent processes occur, the social embedding of action must be examined. This cannot be reduced to a list of “socioeconomic indicators”, because statistically coded social or economic indicators never add up to a social context. They never tell us how the field of decision and action is constituted by the actors engaged in it. It is therefore unsurprising that socioeconomic context, when atomized into a collection of indicators, seems to have little impact on population processes. The problem is that such indicators are blind to the systems and values through which action is articulated, whether in the New York City boardroom or the distant rural clinic. One of the challenges of a specifically anthropological contribution to population studies is to retheorize locality. This is part of the larger project of understanding what is meant by “globality,” and by extension “global flows,” since the global and

the local refer not to places or things, but to relations.

Workshop participants examined translocal information flows in terms of several parameters. The agents engaged in making and moving meaning each enter into the process from a certain perspective. All agents occupy a specific, limited segment of the whole formation. They may have access to more or less far reaching information pertaining to the global information network, but they evaluate and encode that information from the viewpoint of their own current position. Access to information and other resources is always positional. Clearly, not all positions provide equal access to, control over or resources for manipulating information. The second feature, therefore, is symmetry and asymmetry of perspectives. It means simply that two or more positional perspectives may provide similar or dissimilar access to information and resources. The third parameter distinguishes expression from reception of information. It is self evident that an agent's access to information produced by others is distinct from its access to the means of producing information itself. Given a field of agents engaged in these ways, we can then ask a set of questions about the forms of information and other values that circulate through the field. Here there are two specific concerns: how information is amplified or depleted as it moves along translocal trajectories, and how information is transformed in the process. We can think of the former as enrichment or impoverishment, and the latter as the alteration.

Participants recommended that further research on the production and circulation of population knowledge and its effects on fertility and mortality change should address the following questions. How can we best describe the fields and social relationships through which fertility-relevant decisions and actions are undertaken? What kinds of information are taken into account by agents in situ, and how is that information produced, conveyed and evaluated? What are the modalities and attitudes in which it is framed — as knowledge, belief, credible fact, news, fear, hope and so forth? Part of the framing of information turns on the evaluation of its sources, and this raises the question of where, why, how and by whom it is produced. As we observe the movement of information through channels linking international organizations to the places in which policy is implemented, what kinds of transformation does information undergo? And what kinds of interactions occur between sites in different sectors of the total network? We do not assume that

the total network can be meaningfully described as a fixed core-periphery structure in which all the critical information flows from the Euroamerican core to the hinterlands. On the contrary we are keen to define bidirectional trajectories, as well as the incrementing and altering of information as it is received and reproduced. The local is neither included within the global, nor is it merely a peripheral re-fraction of the so-called core).

Workshop organisers are preparing a final report of the Workshop, which is anticipated to be available at the end of this year.

### **International Meeting on “Age Structure Transitions and Policy Dynamics: The Allocation of Public and Private Resources Across Generations”**

Taipei, Taiwan, 6-8 December 2001

The third conference organized by the IUSSP Committee on “Age Structure and Public Policy” and Academia Sinica took place in Taipei, Taiwan, in December 2001. The purpose of this third meeting was to examine issues related with age structural transition in relation to policy dynamics. The conference included seven sessions, which looked at different aspects of intergenerational transfers. The topics covered in these sessions included: the allocation of resources to children and the elderly; factors associated with intergenerational transfers, such as fertility decisions and other demographic events; public spending in education and health; patterns of giving across generations in developed and developing countries; financial and demographic macro-level perspectives; and policy implications.

#### **1. Child and the Elderly: The Public and Private Dimensions**

The three papers presented in this session looked at the allocation of resources to dependents. The first one focused on changes in the provision of public transfers to the elderly in relation to children. The other two papers looked at the set of mechanisms (social contracts and motives) affecting the allocation of private transfers.

In the first paper, “Social Expenditures on Children and the Elderly, 1980-1995: Shifting Allocations, Changing Needs”, Janet Gornick examined possible shifts in the allocation of welfare state expenditures between 1980 and 1995. She addressed two weaknesses that from her point of view pervade the welfare state literature. First,

changes in welfare state provision have not been adequately disaggregated. Second, most assessments on changes in welfare state efforts have failed to take in account changes in levels of need. Using information from 14 industrialized countries, the author compared the expenditures on the elderly relative to children and evaluated changes in needs (changes in population shares and in market earnings). The period under study was marked by considerable changes in demographic and economic conditions. The elderly-child ratio increased in all countries (in some countries more than in others) as a result of a sharp increase (24 percent on average) in the number of elderly persons and a decrease in the absolute number of children. At the same time, the GDP growth outpaced population growth, so GDP per capita grew steadily in all countries. The share of social spending allocated to children benefits compared to elderly benefits changed in diverse ways across countries, but remained unchanged as a share of total social expenditures (28 percent and 7 percent, respectively). When controlling for shifting population shares, the author found that both types of expenditures increase quite sharply in 10 of the 14 countries. The outlays for the elderly grew on average 43 percent (except in Australia), and the amount spent on families with children rose 87 percent (except in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, where cash benefits per child even decreased). Finally, changes in social expenditure relative to market income -as an indicator of need- increased modestly (on average 5 to 6 percent). However, when the change in social transfers relative to this indicator of need was disaggregated, the author found a larger expansion for families with children (about 19 percent) compared with those for the elderly (about 2 percent). In sum, this study did not find evidence of welfare state reversals between 1980 and 1995. The author suggested that studies on welfare state should focus more on changes experienced by different population groups and should extend the traditional measures on welfare state effort.

Nancy Folbre's theoretical paper, "Social Family Contracts and Intergenerational Sharing", offers a framework for understanding some aspects of the distribution of the costs of dependents. She argued that allocation of resources is shaped by social family contracts, which include sharing rules across and between generations. These contractual arrangements do not emerge directly from individual optimization processes, but rather reflect an efficient system of social reproduction and the relative bargaining power of groups.

She developed a model of intergenerational transfers to evaluate family contracts with respect to efficiency and fairness. In this model, workers agree to share their output with dependents (elderly and/or children). If the percentage shared remains constant through generations then a simple form of intergenerational reciprocity is guaranteed (fairness). However, many factors alter these patterns of intergenerational sharing (technological change, change in the relative size of generations, or changes in bargaining power). The author called for more attention on the ways in which an implicit social family contract affects the distribution of output among generations. This paper suggests that social engineering, i.e. collective action that establishes rules, norms, and other social institutions, significantly affects the distribution of the costs of caring for dependents.

In the discussion of the first paper, Anne Gauthier suggested including poverty rate in the analysis to assess if the trend on poverty rate noted in Preston's 1984 paper has occurred in the countries under study. That is, it would be interesting to evaluate whether the shift of public resources from children to the elderly has increased the poverty rate of children and decreased that of the elderly. Additionally, she recommended focusing first in the average of all countries to have an overall picture of the situation and then go on detail to look at each country. She also suggested looking at changes in the composition of the population in further analyses. The participants raised the issue of including services in the analysis to support this thesis. Ian Pool highlighted the importance of taking into account the labor market group, as it might have an important impact on social spending. Regarding the second paper, the discussant wondered if the model presented was a universal proposal. She suggested including more applications to the theoretical model. Ian Pool welcomed the argument that social engineering takes place in the allocation of resources.

The third paper of this session, "Intergenerational Transfers in the Family: What Motives for Giving?", studied the motives of transfer giving. Martin Kohli and Herald Kunemund argued that it is important to assess not only the amount of the transfers, but also the way the monetary transfers are given. Motives are critical to understand the quality of transfers and how people react to changes in transfers. The authors used information from the German Survey of Ageing (retired persons between 40 and 85 years) to assess the structure of transfer motives. Findings from principal components analy-

sis showed that the motivation for giving monetary transfers does not come as a single motive, but instead as a combination of motives that overlap and interact among each other. The results showed that three components or dimensions could explain motivation. The first one denotes unconditional giving, the second one comprises motives that represent giving under certain conditions, and the third (less important dimension) captures independence and separation of the older generation. Thus, the structure of motivation can be explained by a dichotomy of unconditional-conditional giving which does not correspond to the commonly assumed dichotomy of altruism-exchange. Among the predictors of giving, the author found a strong effect of social status and gender. Unconditional giving is more frequent among women and among those with higher income. In short, the authors find that motives have a strong impact on the incidence and the explanation of transfer giving.

The discussant raised issues regarding the quality of data. She suggested including macro level data variables in the analysis (size of the community, indicator of regions, type of activity) as these may have an important effect on the results. Some participants also questioned the quality of data. They discussed that there might be a possible bias in the responses: a product of a social desirability effect. The suggestions for further analyses included: comparing these results with other countries, disaggregating results by people giving and not giving transfers, and looking at factors such as social status, social pressure, and preferences.

## **2. Intergenerational Transfers, Fertility Decisions and the Role of Time**

The three papers presented in this section cover different aspects related to the provision of family support. Cyrus Chu and Ruoh-Rong Yu's paper, "Bequeathable Assets, Social Networks and Family Visits" explained that data from the Taiwanese Panel Study of Family Dynamics shows that the proportion of parents who have divided all their assets is quite high. Furthermore, children's frequency of visits is higher for those families whose assets have been divided than for those whose assets remain intact or who do not possess any assets. The authors argued that neither the hypothesis of accidental bequests nor that of altruistic bequest could explain this phenomenon in Taiwan. Thus, they propose a social network theory to explain the Taiwanese parent-child interaction. They sup-

port the hypothesis that the main driving force of children's behavior is the norm instead of the assets held by parents. Their empirical results show that children's frequency of visits is higher when tighter kinship networks prevail. Additionally, the impact of kinship network is greater when parents have divided all the assets. In other words, the social norm is seriously triggered after asset division. Even when controlling for the possibility that parents may know that asset-division might influence children's behavior, the interaction between kinship network and asset-division still had a significant effect on filial attention. Their findings confirm the importance kinship networks have in explaining the feedback of children to their parents.

The second paper of this session, "Determinants of Two Types of Uxorilocal Marriage in Lueyang, China", aimed at understanding the changing family systems and the marriage customs in rural China. Marcus Feldman and his coauthors pointed out that the location of residence after marriage reflects the traditional patrilineal family system in rural China. Virilocal marriage, where the wife leaves her natal family and moves to her husband's family, occurs almost universally in rural China, while uxorilocal marriage, where the husband leaves his family and moves to his wife's, has been rare. Although cultural factors have an important role in determining the type of marriage, there are economic and demographic factors that affect the decisions on the type of marriage. In Lueyang, one of the rare places in China where the sex ratio at birth is biologically normal (105 compared with 116 on average in the whole China), the proportion of uxorilocal marriages is relatively high (over 30 percent). Thus, information from this county allowed the authors to study in-depth this type of marriage and to compare the determinants between the two types of uxorilocal marriages: contingent, driven mainly by demographic factors; and institutional, driven by practical economic purposes. Findings from this research show that uxorilocal marriage is more likely to occur in families without a son or in those who are unable to adopt a son. The latter suggests that the contingent type is more frequent than the institutional one. The determinants common to both types of uxorilocal marriages are household structure, family clan, and attitudes towards this type of marriage. The only difference is that the effects of the determinants are stronger for the contingent type. Among the unique determinants of the institutional uxorilocal marriage, the most important one is the



influence of parental marriage type within the household. Additionally, the authors found that only institutional uxori-local marriage is transmissible within a household and that transmission has been affected by the 1978 rural economic reform. The low fertility and the increasing number of no-sons families in China will continue to influence marriage customs. The authors conjecture that uxori-local contingent marriage will increase across rural China in order to provide family support for the elderly who are not covered by any social security system.

In the discussion of the first paper of this session, Robert Schoen remarked that the two-stage model used in this analysis shows the power of utility models in illustrating social forces. He asked about the possibility of including other important elements in the analysis such as number of assets, sibling interactions, favorite sons, and co-residents. Other participants were interested in further analyses on changes over time. The author was asked whether family obligation is the only norm that rules the asset division behavior in Taiwan. A final comment suggested that for issues on transfers the researcher should consider the emotional aspect of decisions and not only the rationale choice model.

Regarding the second paper, the discussant commented that results of this study show that marriage customs in China are a mechanism for preserving the family system. One of the participants asked which institutional mechanisms affect these decisions. It was suggested to disaggregate the results according to socio-economic differences.

At the end of this session, Sumon Kumar presented the paper "Intergenerational Transfers: the Ignored Role of Time". He indicated that literature on interviews and intergenerational transfers has focused on the possible determinants of transfers but that it has overlooked two important aspects. First, it has not taken into account the possibility that transfers may be driven by specific events in the recipient's lives (marriage, childbirth, illness). Second, it has overlooked the possibility that within a reasonably long time, transfers may influence household's income as much as household income influences transfers. Using information from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1996 and 1997, the author found that demographic events determine transfers to a significant extent. Findings from this analysis showed that current household income unambiguously has a negative impact on receiving private transfers, while

the demographic events unambiguously have a positive effect on such transfers. Events like marriage, divorce, and childbirth increase both the probability and quantum of private transfers. This fact suggests that savings are aimed not only at supporting old age consumption but also at ensuring children and other members of dynastic families against negative income shocks and positive expenditure shocks. Thus, overlooking the endogeneity of income may lead to bias in the econometric estimations.

The discussant stressed the importance of including time in this type of analysis. He added that it would be wise to look at lifetime of giving to have a better picture of what goes on in the family over time. Questions were raised on the impact of demographic events on transfers. The participants wanted to know if these events are exogenous shots or anticipated events that trigger transfers.

### **3. Education, Health and Intergenerational Transfers**

The first two papers presented in this third session analyzed the impact of public spending on health and education. The third one focused on the changes in private transfers as well as the factors associated with this pattern of transfer giving. Cem Mete and Paul Schultz's paper, "Health and Labor Force Participation of the Elderly in Taiwan", examined public health spending and the efficiency of various schemes for financing public and private health care. The authors assessed the impact of health status on the labor force participation of the elderly and whether the national expansion in health insurance in 1995 in Taiwan encouraged early retirement and hence lower labor force participation. They explained that provision of universal health coverage has been highly debated, as some argue it might have positive effects and others argue the contrary. A national health policy as such may contribute to a healthier population through the use of more health care. Conversely, it may reduce labor force participation and thereby have a negative effect on national income. Using data from the 1989, 1993 and 1996 Surveys of Health and Living Status of Middle Aged and Elderly in Taiwan they analyzed the differences before and after the implementation of the National Health Insurance (NHI). One of the main changes observed was a reduction in the share of household total expenditures spent on health goods and services. This decline was even greater among lower income households, which suggests that the NHI scheme achieved a more equal distribution of health care in Taiwan. Regard-

ing health status, the authors did not find any consistent evidence of improvement or deterioration between 1989 and 1996. Additionally, the analysis did not show a statistically significant reduction in labor supply after the establishment of the NHI program in Taiwan. The response among those most likely to benefit from NHI was to increase labor force participation for women and decrease participation for men, although estimates were not statistically significant. This study demonstrates that universal health coverage did not have a negative impact on the labor force participation of the elderly or on the national economy.

Mark Hayward argued in his paper, "Consequences of Educational Changes for the Burden of Chronic Health Problems in the Population", that as fertility and mortality levels continue to decrease, many developing nations will face the dilemma of investing in benefits for a growing old age population versus investing in benefits for children. He sustained that investments in children's well-being pay substantial dividends decades later when children become the elders of population, both in terms of reducing the burden of elders' health problems at the societal level and in improving the quality of life for individuals. He emphasized the growing recognition that education has far-reaching multiplier effects and that some of these effects are manifested decades later in the reduction of major chronic diseases such as cardiovascular diseases or diabetes. His analysis showed that populations that undergo the education transition from primary schooling or less to the completion of high school are likely to experience a substantial decline in the burden of disease. Furthermore many years of life are added to the average life cycle and the vast majority of these years appear to be years without major functional limitations. In sum, individuals gain longer, healthier lives while the collective costs of health care to future generations of elderly are reduced. He concluded his paper underscoring Preston's argument that society as a whole gains more from a life course perspective than from a generational perspective.

In the discussion of the paper by Cem Mete and Paul Schultz, Shripad Tuljapurkar praised the evidence that the NHI in Taiwan did not decrease labor force participation. He asked about the effect of social security over time and if it was possible to understand the secular changes in labor force participation with these data. In his comments on the second paper, he welcomed the explanation on the relation between health, education, and mortality. The questions re-

ferred to the impact of education throughout time, how changes in education affect this relationship, and the comparison across time and place. Mortality, education and health status are correlated products of economic and cultural settings. Some participants questioned the association between education and health. They argued that education might be part of a stratification process. Moreover they questioned the effects of education transition in health in an egalitarian society. Another issue raised was the need to control for family background in order to avoid overestimating the effect of other variables. Lastly, participants asked about the influence of cohort effects on the results.

The study by I-Fen Lin and co-authors provides a dynamic view of transfer giving in their paper "Stability and Change in the Pattern of Intergenerational Transfers in Taiwan". They used two waves (1989 and 1999) of a unique dataset, the Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly in Taiwan, to assess stability and change in intergenerational transfers. The authors found that approximately two-thirds of the elderly have a stable pattern of financial transfers, with 47.6 percent consistently receiving support and 16.8 percent consistently receiving no support at both survey dates. Another finding relative to changes over time is that a higher percentage of elderly lose support than gain support. A second purpose of the study was to determine which demographic, social, and economic characteristics of the older parents were associated with the pattern of transfers. The results showed that children's provision of financial support largely depends on the needs of their parents. Parents without higher education, those who are not working, those without pensions or assets are more likely than their counterparts to receive financial assistance from their children. The larger the number of children, the more likely the parents will receive support from them and the less likely the parents will lose support over time. Parents' marital disruption reduces the likelihood that they will obtain financial support from their children over time, as compared with married parents. On the other hand, changes in elderly parents' needs (death of a spouse, change in health status, change in assets, among others) are not related to change in parents' receipt of monetary support. Parents who continue to work are less likely to obtain children's support, as compared with parents who are not working at baseline or follow-up. Moving from non-residence to co-residence is associated with gaining support. Parents' acquisition of pensions is asso-

ciated with losing financial support from children.

The discussion of this paper by Diane Macunovich stressed the need of reporting results as descriptive and not as causal because of the type of analysis done. She indicated that more controls in the analysis were needed. First, controlling for other factors that may explain certain causal relationships. Second, controlling for attrition bias due to mortality as results may belong only to the healthy population. She suggested looking at other types of supports other than financial. Participants proposed including other types of controls: presence of grandchildren and type of location (rural or urban area). The last issue raised was timing, i.e. the duration of the support. This is an important question for policy matters as it is important to know for how long the elderly keep their supports.

#### **4. Intergenerational Support and Transfers in Developed and Developing Countries**

Regarding this topic, the first two presentations examined models of intergenerational support in two developing countries: Malawi and Indonesia. The third presentation compared the exchange patterns of 20 industrialized countries. Alexander Weinreb presented a study looking at the importance of lateral components on intergenerational support structures (relations among uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews). In "Substitution, Substitutability and Complementarity: The Effects of Kin Availability on Intergenerational Transfers in Malawi", he argued that in certain societies individuals might have more intensive structured ties with second-order blood relations than with first-order blood relations. Overlooking lateral relations implicitly privileges biology over culture and also ignores a key premise of multiple approaches to the analysis of exchange. Using data of Malawi this paper explored how individuals choose to shape their intergenerational support network out of a universe of people normatively defined as kin. The results obtained imply that individual's transfer relationships are at least in part contingent on the overall structure of the kin network. Kin availability seems to affect the likelihood of transfers much more than it does their value. This is useful to identifying strategies - including transfer strategies - that individuals use in response to demographic changes with respect to kin networks. The author explained the importance of this type of study at the micro and macro level. It allows to understand how individuals tend to structure their exchange networks in response to

particular demographic constraints such as lack of father, maternal uncles, and so on. And, it enables to understand how these aggregated individual actions appear to signal emergent structures of jural obligations that are partly the product of demographic constraints.

Elisabeth Schroder and Philip Kreager's paper, "Age-Structural Dynamics and Local Models of Population Ageing in Indonesia", explored networks over time in three villages in Indonesia in order to uncover patterns between networks and social constructs. They noted that Indonesia is a case of interest for aging, as it has the tenth largest elderly population in the world and the number of elderly persons is likely to increase fourfold over the next three decades. Cohort imbalances persist over most of the 20th century, and strongly suggest that current levels of population aging are due to a significantly different set of demographic factors that will shape the course of age structural transition 20 years from now. Infertility, divorce and migration are among the main disturbing factors that have shaped the size of currently elderly cohorts and the support networks available to them. The authors indicated that the macro-demographic picture provides only the outer contours of current and future intergenerational relations. This paper aimed to provide a more detailed picture of the daily problems faced by the elderly. The comparative study showed the following results: that supports tend to flow from older to younger generations, even when elders are quite old; that co-residence is likely to reflect insufficient income in the younger rather than the older generation; that economic strata are not in themselves a reliable guide to elderly options and behavior; that there is no single reliable rationale for describing which children will assist poorer parents; and that the open duration and timing of support amongst members of a kindred are features which require much more attention than prevailing survey and modeling of economic-demographic interactions generally give.

The discussant, I-Fen Lin, stressed the importance of looking at lateral supports as up to now little attention has been given to this type of support. She asked whether the financial transfers analyzed were regular or just due to an emergency. Another issue raised by the discussant was related to the family hierarchy established for giving supports. Regarding the second paper, she found the results obtained very interesting. She suggested incorporating more family background information into the analysis. She questioned how to generalize results from qualitative data. Both papers were asked on the way to

include a dynamic perspective of support in their analyses.

“Maternal Co-residence and Contact: Evidence from Crossnational Surveys” by Judith Treas and Philip Cohen focused on the exchanges between grown-up children and their mothers. The type of exchanges examined included the likelihood of shared housing and the frequency of face-to-face interaction. This study used data from the International Social Survey Program with information from 20 industrialized countries. The results showed substantial cross-national variation. Not only does the likelihood of living with a mother vary, but also the frequency of visiting a mother with whom one does not live differs from country to country. Another factor associated with intergenerational relationships is gender. While men are more likely than women to live with their mother, women visit their mothers more frequently (although gender differences are not as marked as differences in co-residence). The private intergenerational exchanges captured by maternal co-residence and contact exist in national contexts with distinctive histories of cultural tradition, religious heritage, and state policy. Balance of public and private efforts is most evident at the extremes. In the social democratic countries of Norway and Sweden, where public support is most fully developed, there is less intergenerational contact and markedly less maternal co-residence. By contrast, maternal co-residence and contact is high where de-familiarization by the state is limited (the former socialist countries, and Italy). The author underlined that although there is an association between public and private transfers, they are not interchangeable.

The discussion by Martin Feldman on Treas and Cohen’s paper noted that the main variable of this study, co-residence, may have problems in interpretation as it is difficult to define or establish its boundaries. The discussant agreed on the importance of understanding the impact these patterns have on fertility as the former will have policy implications.

## **5. Financial and Demographic Macro-level Perspectives**

The four papers presented in this session look at the macro aggregate effect of demographic and financial factors on the patterns of intergenerational support. Juha M. Alho and Reijo Vanne argue in their paper “On Predictive Distributions of Public Net Liabilities” that part of the inheritance left to the future generation is the positive or negative public net wealth. They explained that to evaluate the

burden left to the future generations, intertemporal public liabilities (IPL = discounted future entitlements - discounted future taxes - current public wealth) should be viewed as a random variable, and applied to the evaluation of the burden we leave to future generations. That is, IPL calculations should treat all future values as random variables since their results are inherently uncertain. Using a stochastic forecast method, they compared the different sources of uncertainty relative to public liability: future population, future earnings (taxes, pensions), future unemployment (entitlements), future value of current wealth (stocks can have dramatic changes from day to day). The resulting variance corresponding to the share of demographics was 30 percent. The rest was due to economics. The share of uncertainty of future taxes and entitlements was 54 percent, and the remainder 15 percent was due to uncertainty of initial wealth, under the fixed value portfolio policy. Findings from this study demonstrate that current and past generations are not leaving the future generations an inheritance of debt and misery in Finland.

Using personal consumption expenditures data in the U.S., Diane J. Macunovich examined the impact aging of the postwar baby boom has had on patterns of consumption and saving in the economy. Findings from her paper "Lessons from the Baby Boom: Delayed Effects of Fertility on Patterns of Consumption" suggest a very complex pattern of age structure effects. The results are consistent with the life cycle model where there is a marked age-related fluctuation in the proportion of income consumed and saved over the life cycle. But at the same time, there is a much wider range of dependency effects. For example, increases in spending due to changes in one age group might be influenced by variations in the size of other age groups. The effect of age structure on personal consumption revealed at higher levels of income a strong U-shaped pattern of consumption expenditures among children under age 15, with strong savings among children aged about five to twelve. The results support the hypothesis that the dependency effect changes with income level: children in lower income economies have an overall positive (negative) effect on the consumption (saving) rate, but as per capita income rises that effect is reversed. These age-group effects suggest that holding other factors constant, the baby boom generated changes in age structure that have accounted for swings of about 25% in total real aggregate personal consumption demand. The estimates presented suggest that the baby boom has had a major impact on the U.S. economy.



The discussant on Alho and Vanne's paper agreed on the importance of introducing uncertainty in the models as there is always limited information on the future. He suggested as a useful goal to experiment with different values and criteria when designing a policy. This way it will be easier to decide which is the best policy to implement. On the second paper the discussant suggested incorporating other variables into the analysis such as adult equivalence measures and gender. He noted the importance of looking at the impact of these results in policy issues. Nancy Folbre suggested that both papers could benefit from feminist work. Variables such as women's labor force participation might contribute to better understand these phenomena. Comments from the participants suggested looking at the economic age structure of the group 15 to 24. One of the participants indicated that model estimation should take into account that this age group is not only a consumer but also a producer. They suggested the inclusion of two other variables in the analysis: time and regional differences.

In the paper "Age Structure and Aggregate Savings: the Case of Taiwan", Sheng-Cheng Hu and Vei-Lin Chan analyzed the magnitude and the factors associated with the observed changes in Taiwan's household saving system. They argued that since saving behavior is different across ages and generations, the changing age structure has had a severe impact on Taiwan's household saving patterns. Analysis of cross-sectional household data showed that the micro household aggregate saving rate fell by 5 percentage points since 1993. Although the magnitude of this fall is smaller than the decline of the macro aggregate saving rate, Taiwan's households save less. Findings from this study showed that the main determinants of household saving rates are income growth, wealth effect and some demographic variables. The authors found that saving rates have strong negative effects from owning illiquid assets. Furthermore, the younger cohorts, between the ages of 20 and 40, are the ones with higher housing ownership rate. This study confirmed that taking age structure into account is very important for understanding patterns of change. The authors emphasized that to raise household saving rates in Taiwan, faster economic growth is needed.

Robert Schoen and Stefan Jonsson presented the last paper of the conference, "Some Intergenerational Transfer Implications of Birth Fluctuations". Using a cyclically stationary population model, they showed that population dependency burdens and individual gains

and losses from intergenerational transfers vary substantially with the amplitude of birth fluctuations and the length of each cycle. The author explained that substantial temporal and intergenerational issues could arise in the absence of long-term growth when there are fluctuations in the number of births. At the population level, dependency burdens can vary greatly over the course of a cycle. At the individual level, gains or losses from intergenerational transfers differ dramatically by year of birth. They argued that cohort size is a key factor, with large cohorts profiting under defined benefit systems and small cohorts profiting under defined contribution systems.

The discussant of Sheng-Cheng Hu's paper, Juha Alho, asked to be more explicit on the definition of savings. He addressed some methodological enquiries and suggested writing down the assumptions of the model, specifically those regarding the residuals. Regarding Robert Schoen's paper, he suggested an alternative analytical approach to estimate and confirm his results.

## **6. Policy Implications**

Ian Pool presented the conclusions of the third conference of the Committee. He reviewed the significance of policy issues, he highlighted the theoretical and methodological issues emerging from the seminar, he gave a detailed analysis of the components of the model emerging from the seminar, and he mentioned the main conclusions from the papers presented in the conference.

He emphasized that policy directed analysis requires its own theory and the development of methodologies. Throughout the seminar, Ian Pool stressed the need for a more complex interdisciplinary approach. There is a need to study how to integrate theories of rational choice and efficiency. He noted that a key factor for delivering programs and services to specific age groups is the analysis of age structural transitions. Age structure and policy linkage is relevant not only for the social sector, but also for the financial and fiscal sectors. He underlined that time, duration, period and cohort effects are extremely important for this type of modeling. Regarding the distributional mechanisms of transfers, the papers in the seminar concentrated on the private and public sector, however there are other mechanisms such as the voluntary sector and the market. He indicated that mechanisms occur at various levels of aggregation (micro and macro level). In the seminar, Folbre indicated that we cannot separate macro from micro effects, and Macunovich noted

that macro and micro effects show different dimensions. With respect to theoretical issues, Pool outlined that to date the papers have focused on economic or social theories, but little has been done in trying to integrate both theories. This integration is crucial for a better perspective of the phenomenon under study. Additionally, he underlined that these types of studies should elaborate issues of cohort timing, period and duration effects for all the determinants, mechanisms and outcomes. On methodological issues, he mentioned the following issues: extending the traditional welfare state measures, taking into account changing levels of need, and disaggregating results by different groups of age. Concerning the data sources, researchers should extend the range of sources used. There should be an improvement in question design and an increase in the number of multilevel, multimethod surveys. The main lessons from the seminar are:

- To look at the behavior of other generations (third generations, lateral components), not only at the intergenerational ones.
- It is not possible to separate financial/economic effects from emotional/social effects because effects are interrelated.
- Macro and micro effects cannot be separated (state and family provision).
- Intergenerational allocation processes are very complex, as they are multidimensional and multidirectional.

He concluded by saying that this is still a pioneer area, which requires further theoretical and methodological research.

## **Upcoming Meetings**

### ***Réunions à venir***

**Seminar on “Determinants of Diverging Trends in Mortality”, organized by the IUSSP Committee on Emerging Health Threats.**  
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (MPIDR), Rostock, Germany, 19-21 June 2002

Our understanding of major trends in mortality and health is largely based on the classic works of the 1970s by Omran, Preston and

McKeown. These key studies have created a well-justified system of views on the nature of mortality transition observed in the 20th century and its major determinants. In general, they have created a notion of continuous reduction of premature death with economic development through a progressive sequence of mortality structures, defined in terms of ages and causes of death. This “grand theory” of mortality transition is still valued today because it continues to explain a core part of changes and international differences observed in mortality.

However, some of the positive changes predicted in the 1970s on the basis of the historical experience of Europe and North America have not been seen over the last decades. In the 1970s it was expected that less developed countries would follow the historical pathway of the West and that this would result in a global mortality convergence. In fact, during the last three decades many countries and population groups within national populations experienced diverging trends, substantially deviating from the major route of mortality transition. Most remarkably, countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe experienced long term stagnation and even significant decreases in life expectancy due to rising adult-age mortality. The extremely high present levels of mortality from cardiovascular diseases and violence in the countries of former Soviet Union could not be predicted in the 1960s or the 1970s.

Infectious diseases, which seemed to be under firm control at least in developed countries and were rapidly declining in developing countries in the 1970s, have re-emerged since the early 1980s when the first outbreak of AIDS occurred. Many African countries, especially in the Sub-Saharan zone, are experiencing dramatic increases in mortality due to HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. In Africa AIDS has the potential to reduce life expectancy from its present level of 50-60 years to about 30 years.

Increasing levels of trade, people’s growing spatial mobility, continued ecological change and contacts with unusual environments can be also considered as actual and (even more so) growing dangers for the world’s health.

There is good empirical evidence that long-term reduction of mortality differentials between social classes and population groups has slowed down or even reversed in many countries in the last two decades. Over this period the mortality decline tended to be steeper among better-off population groups than among the worse-off

groups. Some poor urban areas in the Americas, Africa and India experience extreme levels of mortality due to violence, poverty, bad nutrition and sanitation, the spread of alcohol and drug abuse, and environmental contamination.

Collective and inter-individual violence has been increasing in many parts of the world during the last three decades as a result of totalitarian attitudes in societies and individuals, purposeful actions or bad management by governments, growing unemployment and poverty, spread of fire arms, and (at least in some cases) resource scarcity combined with high population pressure.

A complex system of links between economic development and mortality has not been fully understood by now. It is now clear that mortality could increase in a paradoxical coincidence with improvements in income and consumption. In some cases mortality does not change significantly after major economic crises, whereas in other cases these are associated with dramatic mortality explosions. Some relatively poor countries have unexpectedly low mortality, while some of the wealthier nations experience significantly higher levels of premature death.

Mortality and health trends in the modern world are determined by multiple socio-economic, cultural, behavioural factors, and probably by the progress in medicine. Overall, it appears that the progress in health and mortality is not an inevitable consequence of a general "development" and that a sustainable improvement in a population's health can not be expected to occur on its own. This important fact calls for a deeper understanding.

The first CEHT Seminar in Rostock will be focused on emerging mortality trends and patterns. It will provide an opportunity for presenting the results of comprehensive analyses on particularly unfavourable and/or unexpected mortality phenomena and to revisit, on this basis, the concept of mortality transition.

The seminar will include the following sessions:

Session 1. Pathways of health transition in a changing world

Session 2. Determinants of long-term unfavourable mortality trends in Central and Eastern Europe

Session 3. Mortality trends after the fall of communism: country case-studies

Session 4. Health policies: adequacy of response to health crises

Session 5. Diverging trends in health transition in the South: country and regional case-studies

Session 6. Increasing socio-economic inequalities in mortality within countries – 1

Session 7. Increasing socio-economic inequalities in mortality within countries – 2

Session 8. Diverging regional trends in mortality within countries

Session 9. Loci of high mortality in metropolitan areas: contextual and socio-economic factors

Session 10. Trends in mortality inequalities at old age

Final session. Summary note by the Chair of the CEHT and round table discussion

For further information, contact:

Vladimir Shkolnikov (Shkolnikov@demogr.mpg.de) or

Edelgard Katke (Katke@demogr.mpg.de).

## **Call for Papers**

### ***Appel aux communications***

**Seminar on “Taking stock of the condom in the era of HIV/AIDS”, organized by the IUSSP Committee on Reproductive Health, in collaboration with The Department of Population Studies, University of Botswana.**

Gaborone, Botswana, October, 2002

Although it was originally designed to prevent infection rather than pregnancy, in the middle of the nineteenth century the condom began to assume a major role as a means of contraception: indeed, it was instrumental in the fertility declines of the late nineteenth century. The condom retained its contraceptive role for many decades, Himes dubbing it in the mid-1930s “the most important contraceptive of our day”. But with the advent in the 1960s of the great coitus-independent “female” methods, the pill and the IUD, the condom lost popularity throughout the industrialized world as a routine, long-term method of contraception, except in Japan.

The choice of the condom for routine contraception is even rarer outside the industrialized countries. The UN estimates that 14

per cent of married couples in the more developed regions rely on the condom (a prevalence heavily weighted by Japan) but only two per cent of couples in the less developed regions in general, and one per cent of couples in Africa.

The emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, and the virus's rapid spread to create the epidemic facing us today, have once again brought the condom into centre stage as the primary means of preventing disease transmission through sexual contact. Nevertheless, despite concerted efforts to the contrary, the condom is grossly under-used, and especially in those regions where the need for it is greatest. In sub-Saharan Africa, condom use with perceivably "risky" sexual partners such as casual partners and prostitutes is undoubtedly more common than with a spouse or other stable or regular partner, but this does not allay concern because the HIV epidemic in that region has now engulfed the general population.

The first seminar of the new Reproductive Health Committee aims to take stock of the condom in the era of HIV/AIDS. We are interested not just in looking at the present situation but in learning from the past, and therefore welcome historical case studies as well as contemporary accounts of condom use for either contraception or disease prevention, or both. We focus primarily on the male condom but are also interested in the female condom, and our approach is broadly empirical.

The seminar will be based around the following four themes. Depending on the submissions we receive, there may also be a session devoted to case studies from Southern and Eastern Africa, with a special focus on Botswana.

### **1. Condom use for pregnancy prevention**

Who used the contraceptive condom in the past, and who uses it today?

How effective should condoms be as contraceptives, how efficient are they in practice, and what causes the difference?

Can one reconcile contraceptive failure rates during one year (or one month) of typical use, which is how the contraceptive condom is generally assessed, with estimated per-coitus probabilities of slip-page and breakage?

What can we learn from past or present condom "success" stories, measuring success in terms of efficiency of use, prevalence of use, or continuation of use? What can we learn from past or present

condom “failure” stories?

## **2. Condom use for disease prevention**

How much did condom use contribute to the past curtailment of epidemics of sexually transmitted diseases?

What are current population prevalences of condom use, and who are the users? What proportions of sexual acts are protected by condom use, and who are the users?

What do we know about the effectiveness of condoms for preventing disease transmission? Can one use data such as the per-coitus probabilities of conception and of disease transmission (various STDs and HIV), with and without condom use, to model the disease-specific effectiveness of the prophylactic condom?

Where are the contemporary “success” stories of condom use for the prevention of the transmission of disease, particularly of HIV, and what explains such success? Where are the contemporary “failure” stories, and what explains such failure?

Are we making good use of existing data?

## **3. Removing barriers to condom use**

What are the most significant barriers to condom use, distinguishing between the contraceptive condom and the prophylactic condom? How do these barriers vary from society to society?

Are there different barriers to continuing use than to adopting the condom in the first place? Are there different barriers to consistent use?

How does one promote condom use among people who are at high risk of contracting HIV but who do not wish to restrict their fertility?

How important for condom promotion are technical improvements designed to reduce the condom’s interference with sexual pleasure?

How important are beliefs about the condom’s side effects and its effectiveness? How important are beliefs about disease transmission? How important are religious or cultural beliefs and proscriptions? How important is the input of government and health officials? What is the role of advertising, the press, and public debate?



#### **4. Intervention strategies**

What are the characteristics of successful intervention strategies for promoting condom use for disease prevention, measuring success in terms of efficiency of use, prevalence of use, or continuation of use? What are the characteristics of unsuccessful strategies? In designing programmes to promote condom use for disease prevention can we draw any lessons from the decades-long experience — both positive and negative — of family-planning programmes?

Can we draw any lessons from public-health efforts to control and prevent infectious diseases in general and sexually-transmitted diseases in particular?

Complete papers or abstracts and a brief (less than one page) *curriculum vitae* should be submitted to the organizer, Gigi Santow (santow@nias.knaw.nl), no later than March 25<sup>th</sup> 2002. Final decisions regarding acceptance will be made by April 25<sup>th</sup> 2002. Completed papers for accepted abstracts should be sent to the organizer no later than August 30<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

## **IUSSP Announcements** ***Annonces de l'UIESP***

### **JOB ANNOUNCEMENT - JOB ANNOUNCEMENT**

The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) invites applications for the post of Executive Director of the Permanent Office (Headquarters) of the Union in Paris. The Executive Director is responsible for the day-to-day management of the Union staff (4 persons), finances, and fund raising. Other important responsibilities include coordination with members and scientific committees, organization of the IUSSP General Conference that is held every four years, and oversight of publications.

The appointment will initially be on a fixed term basis (for one to three years beginning in July 2002) and carries the salary level of a senior researcher at the Institut national d'études démographiques (INED). The net salary (take home) will be in the range of \$US 36-43,000 and the gross salary (benefits, insurance, etc.) will range from \$US 60-78,000.

The following qualifications are required:

- ❑ Strong management abilities and experience in supervising office staff;
- ❑ Experience and ability in international fund raising and proposal preparation. Existing contacts useful;
- ❑ Fluent in English and French with strong written communication skills;
- ❑ Knowledge of financial and book-keeping systems;
- ❑ Training and experience in population studies and/or advanced academic degree would be useful but not essential;
- ❑ Several years of work experience in most or all of the above areas would be desirable.

Applications should include a curriculum vitae and a list of possible references. **Deadline for applications: 30 April 2002.**

Applications should be sent (by surface mail, e-mail or fax) to:

Mary M. Kritz

IUSSP Secretary General

Population and Development Program

Development Sociology

Cornell University

Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-7801

USA

E-mail: [mjj22@cornell.edu](mailto:mjj22@cornell.edu), Fax: +1 607-254-2896

### **OFFRE D'EMPLOI - OFFRE D'EMPLOI**

*Le Bureau de l'UIESP lance un appel à candidature pour le poste de Directeur exécutif du si ège permanent de l'Union à Paris. Le Directeur exécutif est responsable de l'administration quotidienne du personnel (4 personnes), du budget et de la recherche de financement. Il est également responsable de la gestion des services aux membres, de la coordination des commissions scientifiques, de l'organisation de la conférence générale quadriennale et du suivi des publications.*

*Il sera recruté au départ sur la base d'un contrat à durée déterminée (pour 1 à 3 ans, à compter du 1 juillet 2002) et rémunéré aumême niveau qu'un Directeur de recherche à l'Institut national d'études démographiques*

(INED), soit 36.000 à 43.000 dollars par an (brut total 60.000 à 78.000 dollars par an).

*Les qualifications requises sont les suivantes:*

- ❑ *grande capacité de gestion et expérience dans la conduite d'une entreprise de petite taille,*
- ❑ *expérience et efficacité en matière de recherche de financement, de préparation de dossiers de demande et de programmes à soumettre aux bailleurs de fonds. Un bon réseau de contacts sera apprécié,*
- ❑ *parfaite maîtrise anglais/français,*
- ❑ *compétences en matière de budget et de comptabilité,*
- ❑ *diplômes et expérience de recherche en démographie souhaitables mais non indispensables.*

*La demande doit être accompagnée d'un CV et d'une liste éventuelle de références. **Date limite de dépôt: 30 avril 2002.***

*La demande doit être envoyée (par la poste, par e-mail ou par fax) à :*

*Mary M. Kritz*

*Sécrétaire Général de l'UIESP*

*Population and Development Program*

*Development Sociology*

*Cornell University*

*Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-7801*

*USA*

*E-mail:mjj22@cornell.edu, Fax: +1 607-254-2896*

### **New Directory of Members**

During the year 2002, the IUSSP intends to publish an updated hard copy of the Directory of Members. Please complete the form included with this issue of the Bulletin and return it to us by April 30, 2002.

### **Nouveau Répertoire des Membres**

*En 2002, l'UIESP a l'intention de publier un Répertoire des Membres remis à jour. À ce propos, veuillez compléter le formulaire joint à ce numéro du Bulletin et nous le renvoyer avant le 30 avril 2002.*

## **Other Announcements** ***Autres annonces***

### **United Nations Population Division**

The United Nations Population Division is pleased to announce two important electronic offerings.

The United Nations Population Division web site ([www.unpopulation.org](http://www.unpopulation.org)) now provides population data on line (UNPOP). UNPOP gives access to the data from the 2000 Revision of the United Nations official world population estimates and projections. To access UNPOP, please go to the web site and select "Population Database, UNPOP".

The United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN) web site has been redesigned to facilitate access to the increasing wealth of international, regional and national population information available from United Nations sources. The POPIN web site address remains unchanged, as [www.popin.org](http://www.popin.org).

### ***Division de la Population de l'Organisation des Nations Unies***

*Le site web de la Division de la Population de l'Organisation des Nations Unies ([www.unpopulation.org](http://www.unpopulation.org)) fournit maintenant des données de population en ligne (UNPOP). UNPOP donne accès aux données de la Révision 2000 des estimations et projections officielles des populations du monde réalisées par les Nations Unies. Pour accéder à UNPOP, veuillez visiter le site web et choisissez "Population Database, UNPOP".*

*Le site web du réseau d'information sur la population de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (POPIN) a été reconstruit pour faciliter l'accès à la quantité croissante d'informations démographiques régionales, nationales et internationales fournies par des sources appartenant au système des Nations Unies. L'adresse du site web de POPIN demeure inchangée : [www.popin.org](http://www.popin.org).*

### **It's back: The weekly scientific seminar at INED**

After a two year hiatus, we are announcing the return of the scientific seminar "Démodynamiques." This is a weekly opportunity for researchers both inside and outside INED to present new work and discuss population questions. The seminar is open to all.

The weekly schedule can be found at <http://www.leslundis.ined.fr/demodyn.html> along with a sign-up sheet.

Alternatively, please send a message with your e-mail address to demodyn@ined.fr in order to be added to the e-mail announcement list.

***Le séminaire hebdomadaire Démodynamiques reprend vie !***

*Après deux années d'interruption, le séminaire scientifique Démodynamiques, lieu d'échanges entre chercheurs INED et hors-INED qui s'intéressent aux questions de population, reprend vie.*

*Il est ouvert à tous les publics et une liste électronique sera régulièrement mise à jour par le secrétariat du séminaire pour l'envoi systématique du programme scientifique. N'hésitez donc pas à vous inscrire sur cette liste en nous envoyant vos coordonnées électroniques.*

*Le programme scientifique des séances est en cours d'établissement. Il sera prochainement affiché avec les autres informations concernant le séminaire sur le site de l'INED. Vous êtes invités à le consulter dès maintenant sur <http://www.leslundis.ined.fr/demodyn.html>*

## **Junior Demographers for 2001** ***Jeunes démographes 2001***

The IUSSP offers grants for each seminar/workshop organised by its Scientific Committees. The Union has been taking steps to encourage the participation of young scholars in its activities. The IUSSP Junior Demographer Award is getting very popular amongst members and non members alike.

In the year 2001 alone, six Junior Demographer awards were granted to young demographers from different countries to enable them attend an IUSSP seminar in their field of interest. The awards were granted to the following candidates: Chiweni Chimbwete (Malawi), Rebecca Kippen (Australia), Cecilia Tomassini (Italy), Marta Roig (Spain), Xia Du (China) and Carmen Huerta (Mexico).

Candidates are normally expected to be the holders of an advanced degree in a subject related to the seminar and junior in the profession. Each candidate must be sponsored by two IUSSP members. A letter of recommendation from each sponsor and the candidate's curriculum vitae should arrive at IUSSP Secretariat two months before the start of the seminar.

The current availability of these grants and their respective

deadlines can be viewed on the IUSSP website ([www.iussp.org/English%20Site/Announcements/9newin.htm](http://www.iussp.org/English%20Site/Announcements/9newin.htm)).

*L'UIESP propose des bourses pour chaque séminaire/atelier organisé par ses Comités scientifiques. Elle a entrepris des démarches importantes pour encourager les jeunes démographes à participer à ces activités. Les bourses pour Jeunes Démographes de l'UIESP connaissent un vif succès auprès des membres, mais aussi auprès des non-membres.*

*Pour l'année 2001 seulement, six bourses ont été offertes à des jeunes démographes de différents pays pour leur permettre d'assister à un séminaire de l'UIESP dans leur domaine de recherche. Des bourses ont été accordées aux candidats suivants : Chiweni Chimbwete (Malawi), Rebecca Kippen (Australie), Cecilia Tomassini (Italie), Marta Roig (Espagne), Xia Du (Chine) et Carmen Huerta (Mexique).*

*Les candidats doivent en général être titulaires d'un DEA ou d'un doctorat sur un sujet en rapport avec le thème du séminaire et être débutants dans la profession. Chaque candidat doit être recommandé par deux membres de l'UIESP. Une lettre de recommandation de chaque parrain et un curriculum vitae du candidat devront arriver au Secrétariat de l'UIESP deux mois avant le début du séminaire.*

*La disponibilité actuelle de ces bourses et les dates limites sont affichées sur le site web de l'Union ([www.iussp.org/English%20Site/Announcements/9newin.htm](http://www.iussp.org/English%20Site/Announcements/9newin.htm)).*

## **Recent IUSSP Publications** ***Publications récentes de l'Union***

**IUSSP "International Studies in Demography",  
Oxford University Press**

Fertility Transition in South Asia,

Eds. Zeba Ayesha Sathar and James F. Phillips, 2001

*Cultural Perspectives on Reproductive Health,*

Ed. Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, 2001

Asian Population History,

Eds. Ts'ui-jung Liu, James Lee, David Sven Reher, Osamu Saito and

Wang Fang, 2001

**IUSSP Policy and Research Papers**

No. 18 - *Population Ageing in Industrialized Countries*,  
Gustavo De Santis, 2001

**Miscellaneous**

*IUSSP Contributions to Gender Research*, 2001

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## **Obituaries** ***Nécrologies***

**Nora Federici**  
**1910-2001**

The recent death of Nora Federici has saddened the entire international community of population scientists. She made such an impact during her career that a chapter in the history of population studies is coming to a close with her death, a chapter which we will all enjoy looking back upon. I will not attempt to catalogue her tireless campaigning for women, her commitment to education or her important contribution to the development of population studies in Italy. I would simply like to bear witness to Nora Federici's active presence on the international scene, particularly her involvement with the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population.

I first met her in 1973, at the General Conference in Liège. She was the organiser for a session called "The Teaching of Population Studies and the Role of Population Scientists". She was so captivating and convincing, warm and elegant that I remember thinking at the time that the students and young researchers in Italy were extremely lucky to have her... This first impression proved justified and was reinforced on each subsequent occasion that I met her during IUSSP General Conferences and Scientific Seminars. Her contribution at the Asker Conference in Norway in 1988 remains the most memorable, when she organised sessions with Karen Mason and Solvi Søgner which resulted in an excellent Oxford University Press

publication entitled “Women’s Position and Demographic Change”. If one had to summarize Nora Federici’s contribution to population studies in four words, this title would fit the bill. Nora Federici’s activities on the international scene were certainly not confined to the IUSSP. She also worked very hard to bring the fruits of scientific research to the attention of politicians. Most notably, she was a member of the United Nations Commission that produced the well-known World Population Action Plan, which was adopted in Bucharest in 1974. It was for all these reasons, and numerous others, that the IUSSP Council in 1992 named her Laureate.

The memory of Nora Federici is not limited to all that I have mentioned so far. The population scientists of my generation have lost a mother, and many of the younger generation of population scientists have lost a grandmother. Her loss has left us bereft, but at the same time rich with the scientific contributions that she has bequeathed to us. We will continue to benefit from her work and will pass it on to the next generation of population scientists.

*La disparition de Nora Federici attriste la communauté internationale des démographes tout entière. Elle a tellement marqué son époque que c’est aussi une page de l’histoire de notre discipline qui se termine avec elle. Une page toutefois que nous prendrons toujours plaisir à relire. Je ne rappellerai ici ni son combat inlassable pour la femme, ni son dévouement indéfectible à l’enseignement, ni sa contribution majeure au développement de la science démographique en Italie. D’autres le feront beaucoup mieux que moi. Je voudrais tout simplement témoigner de la présence active de Nora Federici sur la scène internationale et notamment à l’Union internationale pour l’étude scientifique de la population.*

*C’est en 1973, au congrès de Liège que, pour la première fois, jeune démographe, il m’a été donné d’en juger. Elle organisait une séance sur “l’enseignement de la démographie et le rôle des démographes”. Elle était si captivante, si convaincante et, tout à la fois, si élégante et chaleureuse dans sa façon de s’exprimer que j’ai tout de suite pensé que les étudiants et les jeunes chercheurs italiens avaient bien de la chance... Par la suite, que ce soit dans les grands congrès ou dans les séminaires scientifiques de l’Union dans lesquels j’ai eu l’occasion de la rencontrer, ce premier jugement n’a jamais été pris en défaut. Plus marquante que toutes les autres fut évidemment la Conférence d’Asker en Norvège, en 1988, dont elle fut l’organisatrice avec Karen Mason et Solvi Søgner et dont le meilleur a produit un excellent*



*ouvrage publié par Oxford University Press : Women's Position and Demographic Change. Un titre qui, s'il fallait résumer en quatre mots la contribution de Nora Federici au progrès de notre discipline, conviendrait parfaitement. Mais l'activité de Nora Federici sur la scène internationale ne s'arrêtait pas à l'UIESP. Elle a aussi beaucoup œuvré pour porter les fruits de la recherche scientifique à la connaissance des décideurs politiques. Elle a notamment fait partie de la Commission des Nations Unies qui a rédigé le fameux Plan mondial d'action pour la population adopté à Bucarest en 1974. C'est pour toutes ces raisons et pour bien d'autres encore que le Conseil de l'UIESP lui a décerné, en 1992, le prix de l'Union.*

*Mais le souvenir de Nora Federici ne se limite pas à ces raisons, aussi belles soient-elles. Pour bien des démographes de ma génération, c'est une mère que nous perdons et, pour beaucoup de plus jeunes, sans doute une grand-mère. Nous voici donc tous, de près ou de loin, orphelins. Tristes, mais riches du message qu'elle nous a légué et que nous continuerons d'enrichir et de transmettre aux générations suivantes.*

Jacques Vallin

### **Jerzy Z. Holzer** **1930-2001**

Professor Jerzy Z. Holzer, long-term director of the Institute of Statistics and Demography, Warsaw School of Economics, and chairman of the Division of Social Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences, died suddenly on September 29, 2001 at the age of 71.

Jerzy Z. Holzer was born on July 24, 1930. In 1953 he graduated from the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw from where he also obtained further degrees (a Ph. D. in 1963 and a Doctor *habilitatus* in 1968). In 1979 he was awarded the title of professor by the State Council. In 1991, Professor Holzer was elected as a corresponding member of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and in 1995 as a member of the *Academia Europea*. In the period of 1981-1985 he was a member of the *IUSSP Council*.

He started working as a student – assisting the Chair of Statistics, Central School of Planning and Statistics in 1950 - and continued his work for the School (since 1991 renamed Warsaw School of Economics/*Szkoła Główna Handlowa*) with some breaks until the end of his life.

In the period of 1963-1966 he lectured at the University of Ghana in Legon and came back to Africa for two years in 1971-1973

as a regional adviser for the UN, working at the Population Programme Centre, Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa. Immediately after “the African period” he held the post of demographer in the Division of Social Affairs of the UN in Geneva (1973-1977).

Professor Holzer returned to Poland in 1977 and in 1978 was nominated director of the Institute of Statistics and Demography, and kept this position for 21 years, until September 1999.

He played a very important role in Polish demography: as a scientist, organizer and leader of many research projects (national and international) as well as a teacher, respected and admired by his students. He contributed to the education of several generations of Polish demographers and his “Demography” is the most widely used handbook in demographic analysis in Poland. Professor Holzer introduced Polish demography to the international scientific community and to networks of international scientific collaboration – he was a great Ambassador of Polish demography to the world.

His death is a great loss to Polish and international science. Professor Holzer will always remain in our grateful memory.

*Le professeur Jerzy Z. Holzer, longtemps directeur de l'Institut de Statistique et de Démographie de l'École d'Études Économiques de Varsovie et président du Département des Sciences Sociales de l'Académie des Sciences de Pologne, est mort subitement le 29 septembre 2001 à l'âge de 71 ans.*

*Jerzy Z. Holzer est né le 24 juillet 1930. Après avoir obtenu en 1953 une licence, puis un doctorat en 1963 et enfin le titre de Doctor Habilitatus en 1968 à l'École Centrale de Planification et de Statistique de Varsovie, il est nommé professeur par le Conseil d'État en 1979. En 1991, il est élu membre correspondant de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences, et membre de l'Academia Europea en 1995. Il fut membre du Conseil de l'UIESP de 1981 à 1985.*

*Il a commencé sa carrière en 1950, alors qu'il était encore étudiant, au poste d'assistant de la chaire de statistique à l'École Centrale de Planification et de Statistique, et a continué à travailler pour cette école (devenue en 1991 École d'Études Économiques de Varsovie – Szkoła Główna Handlowa) presque sans interruption jusqu'à la fin de sa vie.*

*Entre 1963 et 1966 il enseigne à l'Université du Ghana à Legon ; il revient en Afrique, à Addis-Abeba, entre 1971 et 1973, pour occuper pendant deux ans le poste de Conseiller Régional de l'ONU, au Population Programme Center de la Commission Économique pour l'Afrique. À la*

*suite de sa "période africaine", il obtient un poste de démographe à la Division des Affaires Sociales des Nations Unies à Genève (1973-1977).*

*Le Professeur Holzer sera de retour en Pologne en 1977 et nommé directeur de l'Institut de Statistique et de Démographie en 1978, poste qu'il occupera pendant 21 ans, jusqu'en septembre 1999.*

*Il a joué un rôle important dans la démographie polonaise en tant que chercheur, organisateur et chef de nombreux projets (nationaux et internationaux) de recherche, mais aussi en tant que professeur, respecté et admiré par ses étudiants. Il a contribué à la formation de plusieurs générations de démographes polonais et son livre « Démographie » est devenu un ouvrage incontournable en Pologne en matière d'analyse démographique. Reconnu comme l'ambassadeur de la démographie polonaise dans le monde, il a largement contribué à la faire connaître auprès de la communauté scientifique internationale et des réseaux internationaux de collaboration scientifique.*

*Sa disparition représente une grande perte pour la science polonaise et internationale. Le Professeur Holzer sera à jamais présent dans notre mémoire.*

Janina Józwiak

## **Eugene Grebenik 1919-2001**

Members of the Union will be saddened to hear that Eugene Grebenik died on 14 October 2001, after a long illness.

Grebbly's long association with the IUSSP (he became a member in 1949) reflected his interests in European demography, his commitment to international cooperation, and his service to the discipline through administration, editorial work, and his own research. He was Secretary General of the Union from 1963 to 1972, and organized three IUSSP General Population Conferences: the XIVth, in Ottawa in 1963; the XVth in Belgrade in 1965 held in conjunction with the second United Nations World Population Conference; and the XVIth in London in 1969. He was a member of the Committee on Multilingual Demographic Dictionary (1949-1969), the Committee on International Demographic Terminology (1969-1981), and the Committee on Legislation Directly or Indirectly Influencing Fertility in Europe (1971-1974). He served the Union also in other practical ways, such as handling membership dues paid in sterling. He carried out this important but undoubtedly tedious task for many years.

Grebbby's own publications were influential but few, perhaps in obedience to his own maxim: 'People publish too much'. Instead, he devoted what many would judge to be the most significant part of his professional life to trying to ensure that what was published was good, and in helping authors to make it so. During his fifty-year association with *Population Studies* he read every paper that was submitted and contributed to the improvement of those that the journal accepted. No paper escaped his red pen, and ones of merit that were written in more than usually defective English he substantially rewrote. His letters of rejection were as graceful as were those of provisional acceptance, the latter generally requesting that a paper be reduced in length by 30 per cent. But this was not just a routine formula. Authors who honestly attempted to remove this proportion before submitting a paper in the first place would find that no further deletion was required.

Along the way, Grebby was instrumental in creating a journal that remains the broadest in the field in terms of subject matter, geographical coverage, disciplinary approach, data source, and time frame. In recognition, in 1997 he was awarded the first Olivia Schieffelin Nordberg Award for excellence in editing in the population sciences. From its founding by the Population Investigation Committee in 1947 until the first issue of Volume 53 in 1999, receiving *Population Studies* was one of the prerequisites of Union membership.

Grebbby was a witty conversationalist and a delightful dinner companion. An erudite polyglot, he demonstrated to many of us how much we miss by not having numerous languages effortlessly at our command. He was kind to children, animals, and young demographers. His foibles endeared him to his friends: his distaste for the jollity of Christmas; his quest to complete The Saturday Times cryptic crossword and win the Times Atlas; his dislike of hot weather, salad, and aeroplanes. He enjoyed relating that he always liked to travel with a Trollope.

Grebbby was a talented yet modest man, qualities that are all too rarely found together. He made an enormous contribution to demography in general, and to the Union in particular.

*Les membres de l'Union seront attristés d'apprendre le décès d'Eugène Grebenik, survenu le 14 octobre 2001, à la suite d'une longue maladie.*

*Le long partenariat de Grebby avec l'UIESP (il était membre depuis 1949) reflète son intérêt pour la démographie européenne, son engagement dans la coopération internationale et les services qu'il a rendus à la discipline à travers ses responsabilités administratives, son activité de rédacteur et ses recherches. Il fut Secrétaire Général de l'Union de 1963 à 1972 et organisa trois Congrès généraux de l'UIESP : le XIV<sup>e</sup> à Ottawa en 1963, le XV<sup>e</sup> à Belgrade en 1965, organisé en lien avec la seconde Conférence mondiale des Nations Unies sur la Population, et le XVI<sup>e</sup> à Londres en 1969. Il fut membre du Comité du dictionnaire démographique multilingue (1949-1969), du Comité de terminologie démographique internationale (1969-1981), et du Comité d'étude des législations influençant directement ou indirectement la fécondité en Europe (1971-1974). Il a également servi l'Union dans d'autres domaines plus terre à terre, tels que la gestion des cotisations payées en sterling. Il assumait cette tâche importante bien que laborieuse pendant de longues années.*

*Les publications de Grebby furent d'un grand intérêt mais rares, peut-être en accord avec sa propre maxime : 'Les gens publient trop'. Il se consacra davantage à ce que beaucoup estimeront être la partie la plus significative de sa carrière, c'est-à-dire à s'assurer de la qualité des publications et à aider les auteurs dans ce sens. Au cours de ses cinquante années de collaboration avec Population Studies, il a lu tous les articles présentés et contribué à l'amélioration de ceux que le journal acceptait. Aucun article n'a échappé à son crayon rouge ; les textes de bonne qualité écrits dans un anglais un peu trop médiocre, il les récrivait en grande partie. Ses lettres de refus étaient tout aussi aimables que ses lettres d'acceptation provisoire, généralement sous réserve d'une réduction de 30 pour cent du volume de l'article. Mais il ne s'agissait pas là d'une simple formule de routine. Les auteurs qui s'efforçaient honnêtement d'opérer cette réduction de 30 % avant de soumettre leur article ne se voyaient pas demander des coupures supplémentaires.*

*Au cours des années, Grebby a activement contribué au développement d'une revue qui reste la plus ouverte dans notre domaine en termes de sujets traités, de couverture géographique, d'approche disciplinaire, de sources de données et de calendrier. En témoignage de reconnaissance, il a reçu le premier prix Olivia Schieffelin Nordberg en 1997 pour l'excellence de ses travaux d'éditeur de textes démographiques. Parmi les avantages liés à leur adhésion, les membres de l'Union ont reçu Population Studies sans interruption de 1947, année de sa création par le Population Investigation Committee, jusqu'à la parution du premier numéro du 53<sup>e</sup> volume en 1999.*

*Grebby était un interlocuteur plein d'esprit et un charmant convive.*

*Polyglotte érudit, il a montré à beaucoup d'entre nous tout ce que nous perdons à ne pas maîtriser parfaitement plusieurs langues. Il aimait les enfants, les animaux, les jeunes démographes et les Trollope. Ses faiblesses inspiraient la sympathie : son dédain pour l'exubérance des fêtes de Noël ; sa passion pour les mots croisés cryptés du Saturday Times et son espoir de remporter le premier prix, l'Atlas du Times ; sa répulsion pour la chaleur, la salade et les avions.*

*Grebby était un homme de talent mais modeste, des qualités trop rarement associées chez une même personne. Sa contribution à la démographie en général et à l'Union en particulier est considérable.*

Gigi Santow

## **General Population Conference** ***Congrès général de l'Union*** **Salvador, Brazil / *Brésil*, 2001**

### **Statistics**

#### *Statistiques*

The General Population Conference was held on August 18-24, 2001 in Salvador, Brazil. 994 participants attended the Conference. This figure does not include those registered as accompanying persons.

The global distribution of participation represents a marked improvement over that achieved in Beijing four years previously where, for example, there were virtually no African participants. This success was made possible by the relatively abundant resources which were available to support participants.

There were 88 traditional paper sessions with four papers apiece, thus approximately 350 scientific papers were presented. In addition to regular scientific paper presentation sessions and poster sessions, several special sessions were held:

Four plenary debate sessions encouraged discussion of controversial population policy questions. The questions selected for debate and the panels were "Did Cairo miss the mark?", "Are there limits to human life span?", "Is below replacement fertility here to stay?", and "Should borders be open?"

A Science Policy session, co-sponsored by the United Nations

Population Fund (UNFPA), discussed the contribution of population scientists to international policy initiatives on sustainable development.

Three skill building sessions – Communicating with Peers, Communicating with General Audiences, and Communicating with the Media – were held to help conference participants to increase their effectiveness. These sessions were prepared in collaboration with the Alan Guttmacher Institute. Another session gave conference participants the chance to meet with editors of major journals in the field.

Other innovations at the Brazil General Conference which were well received by members include: a strict time keeping system in the sessions, the Cyber Café, the computer room where presenters could prepare their presentations in PowerPoint, a luncheon for IUSSP Scientific Committee Chairs and poster presentations by IUSSP Scientific Committees.

*Le Congrès Général de la Population a eu lieu le 18-24 août, 2001 à Salvador, Brésil. 994 personnes ont participé au Congrès. Ce chiffre n'inclut pas les personnes accompagnantes.*

*La répartition régionale des participants affiche une nette amélioration par rapport au congrès de Beijing quatre ans auparavant, où, par exemple, il n'y avait pratiquement aucun participant africain. Ce succès est imputable aux ressources relativement importantes qui ont été dégagées pour aider les participants.*

*Il y a eu 88 séances classiques comportant chacune quatre présentations, soit environ 350 communications scientifiques. En dehors des séances classiques et des séances d'affichage, plusieurs séances spéciales ont eu lieu :*

*Quatre séances plénières de débat ont favorisé la discussion de questions controversées en matière de politique de population. Les questions soumises aux débats et aux tables rondes étaient : "Le Caire a-t-il manqué son but ?", "Existe-t-il des limites à la longévité humaine ?", "La fécondité en dessous du niveau de remplacement va-t-elle durer ?", et "Faut-il ouvrir les frontières ?"*


*Une séance sur la science et la politique, co-financée par le FNUAP, a traité de la contribution des démographes aux initiatives politiques internationales en matière de développement durable.*

*Trois séances d'amélioration des compétences – Communiquer avec ses collègues, Communiquer avec le public, Communiquer avec les médias – ont été organisées afin d'aider les participants à améliorer leur efficacité.*

*Ces séances ont été préparées en collaboration avec le Alan Guttmacher Institute. Une autre séance a permis aux participants de rencontrer les éditeurs des principales revues de démographie.*

*D'autres nouveautés du Congrès de Salvador ont été très appréciées par les participants : un système strict de contrôle du temps de parole, le cybercafé, la salle informatique où les orateurs pouvaient préparer leurs présentations en PowerPoint, un déjeuner pour les présidents des Comités scientifiques de l'Union, ainsi que des présentations sur panneaux des travaux de ces comités.*

### **Nationality of participants** **Répartition des participants par nationalité**





**IUSSP 'International Studies in Demography', Oxford University Press**  
**Available Titles / *Titres disponibles***

- Fertility Transition in South Asia, Z. Sathar & J. Phillips, 2001
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- Women's Empowerment and Demographic Processes, H. Presser & G. Sen, 2000
- Women, Poverty and Demographic Change, Brígida García, 2000
- Fertility and the Male Life-Cycle in the Era of Fertility Decline, C. Bledsoe, S. Lerner & J. Guyer, 2000
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- Sexual Cultures and Migration in the Era of AIDS - Anthropological and Demographic Perspectives, G. Herdt, 1997
- The Fertility Transition in Latin America, J. M. Guzman, S. Singh, G. Rodriguez & E. Pantelides, 1996
- Health and Mortality among Elderly Populations, G. Caselli & A. Lopez, 1996
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- Economic and Demographic Change in Africa, A. Mafeje & S. Radwan, 1995
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- The Family, the Market, and the State in Ageing Societies, J. Ermisch & N. Ogawa, 1994

Old and New Methods in Historical Demography, D. Reher & R. Schofield, 1993

The Revolution in Asian Fertility - Dimensions, Causes, and Implications, R. Leete & I. Alam, 1993

Biomedical and Demographic Determinants of Reproduction, R. Gray with H. Leridon & A. Spira, 1993

Women's Position and Demographic Change, N. Federici, K. Oppenheim Mason & S. Søgner, 1993

Family Systems and Cultural Change, E. Berquo & P. Xenos, 1992

Demographic Applications of Event History Analysis, J. Trussell, R. Hankinson & J. Tilton, 1992

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Population, Food and Rural Development, R. Lee, B. Arthur, A. Kelley, G. Rodgers & T.N. Srinivasan, 1988

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